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Gender Equality and Judicial
Federalism: The Role of State
Appellate Courts
By G. ALAN TARR* AND MARY CORNELIA PORTER**
Introduction
State court contributions to the development of public policy have
been the subject of increasing interest in recent years. Highly visible
appellate court decisions involving such subjects as school finance,' the
"right to die," 2 exclusionary zoning,3 and "palimony" 4 have attracted
attention to state court decisions and their consequences. Recent stud-
ies document the wide-ranging effects of less publicized rulings on the
rights of criminal defendants,5 on the administration of criminal jus-
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1970.
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the Rutgers University Research Council.
1. E.g., Serrano v. Priest II, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976);
Serrano v. Priest 1, 5 Cal. 3d 584,487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill
II, 67 N.J. 333, 339 A.2d 193 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill I, 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
For an overview of this litigation, see Thomas, Equalizing Educational Opportunity Through
School Finance Reform: 4 Review Assessment, 48 U. CIN. L. REv. 255 (1979).
2. Eg., In re Quinlan, 70 NJ. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). For
an overview of this litigation, see Hyland and Baime, In re Quinlan: A Synthesis of Law and
Medical Technology, RUT.-CAM. L. Rv. 37 (1976).
3. E.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J.
151, 336 A.2d 713 (1971), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). For an overview of state exclu-
sionary zoning cases, see Harrison, State Court Activism in. Exclusionary Zoning Cases, in
STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 55 (Porter & Tarr eds.
1982).
4. Eg., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660,557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1977). See
N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1979, at 18, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1979, § 3, at 1, col. 5; N.Y.
Times, Jan. 31, 1979, at 8, col. 15; N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1979, at 14, col. 2.
5. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and the Protection of Defendants'Rights: The
Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 157 (1979).
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tice,6 and on the protection of tenants and other consumers.7 Historical
surveys demonstrate that, far from being a recent development, state
court policymaking has been a standard feature of American law.8
Although state court policymaking is by no means novel, the con-
text in which it occurs does change, and these changes may affect its
form and character. This article examines the effects of one such con-
textual change-the development of the "new judicial federalism"--
through an analysis of state appellate decisions concerning gender
equality. In Part I of this article, we trace the origins of the new judi-
cial federalism, analyze its relationship to earlier forms of judicial fed-
eralism, and review the controversy about its implications. In Part II,
we survey state courts' constitutional decisions pertaining to gender
equality and posit that the new judicial federalism has not promoted
state court activism in this field. In Part III, we review state courts'
nonconstitutional decisions affecting gender equality and find that
through these decisions state courts have made a significant contribu-
tion to sexual equality. In the conclusion of this article, we apply the
results of this study to understanding the role of state courts in protect-
ing individual rights.
I. The New Judicial Federalism
The relationships between state and federal courts vary over time
and over issues. In some areas of the law, such as self-incrimination,9
state and federal court systems operate quite independently of one an-
other. In other areas, such as establishment of religion ° and the exclu-
6. See, e.g., Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of
the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421 (1974); Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure Revis-
ited, 64 Ky. L.J. 729 (1976).
7. See R. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE; REFORMING THE PRIVATE LAW (1969);
P. MARTIN, THE ILL-HOUSED: CASES AND MATERIALS ON TENANTS' RIGHTS IN PRIVATE
AND PUBLIC HOUSING (1971); Baum & Canon, State Supreme Courts as Activists" New Doc-
trines in the Law of Torts, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM, supra note 3; Leflar, Appellate Judicial Innovation, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 321, 328-32
(1974).
8. Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme Courts,
1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REv. 121 (1977); Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, The
Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REv. 961 (1978).
9. For example, in People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 105, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360
(1976), the California Supreme Court chose not to follow Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 22
(1971) (modifying Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
10. See, e.g., Rhoades v. School Dist., 424 Pa. 202,226 A.2d 53 (1967) (following Engle
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)). See generally A. TAPR, JUDICIAL IMPACT AND STATE
SUPREME COURTS (1977).
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sionary rule,'I the United States Supreme Court provides leadership
for state courts. In yet others, such as the regulation of obscenity' 2 and
the legalization of abortion,' 3 state courts have provided direction for
federal courts.
For many years, state courts, not federal courts, rendered the final
decisions in the vast majority of civil liberties cases. 14 The subsequent
extension of the Bill of Rights to the states, greatly accelerated during
the Warren Court years, overruled a substantial number of state court
holdings and transferred primary responsibility for the protection of
individual rights to the federal courts.' 5 This development, however,
did not totally eclipse state court involvement. State courts have con-
siderable leeway, which they have exercised, in responding to Supreme
Court mandates.' 6 In addition, state courts have continued to influence
the Supreme Court by suggesting constitutional solutions, by pointing
out ambiguities in Court rulings, and by impelling the Court to clarify
11. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Williams, 175 Ohio St. 186, 192 N.E.2d 63 (1963) (follow-
ing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)). See generally Canon, Reactions of State Supreme
Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court Civil Liberties Decision, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 109 (1973).
12. For example, The Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 218 N.E.2d 668, 271
N.Y.S.2d 947 (1964), provided direction for the variable obscenity doctrine in Ginsberg v.
New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). See generally Kramer & Riga, The New York Court of
Appeals and the United States Supreme Court, 8 PUBLIUS 75 (1978).
13. For example, People v. Barksdale, 8 Cal. 3d 320, 503 P.2d 275, 105 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1972), provided direction for the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14. L. BETH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ch. 8 (1971). His-
tories of the Supreme Court record the relative paucity of civil liberties considered by the
Court prior to World War II in comparison with those heard by the Warren Court. See W.
MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES (1972); W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTI-
TUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE OLD LEGALITY 1889-1932 (1969); W. SWIN-
DLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE NEW LEGALITY
1932-1968 (1970).
15. Most provisions of the first eight amendments to the United States Constitution
were incorporated between 1925 and 1968. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)
(freedom of speech); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press); Hamil-
ton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (freedom of religion); De Jonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (establishment clause); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (search and seizure);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (cruel and unusual punishment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to
counsel); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964) (self-incrimination); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation of witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967) (speedy trial); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (trial by jury); Benton v.
Maryland, 392 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy).
16. See A. TARR, supra note 10; Canon, supra note 11; Romans, The Role of State
Supreme Courts in Judicial Policymaking-Escobedo, Miranda and the Use of Judicial Im-
pact Analysis, 27 W. POL. Q. 38 (1974).
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and modify its decisions.'
7
The relationship between state and federal courts has recently
shifted-a change that is referred to as the "new judicial federalism' 8
and that is marked by Supreme Court deference to state court rulings. 19
Neither fish nor fowl, the new judicial federalism contains elements of
both the pre-Warren Court division of responsibilities and the "nation-
alization" of civil liberties associated with that Court.20
- The Burger Court is responsible, both directly and indirectly, for
the new judicial federalism. It has indirectly encouraged states to base
their decisions on their own constitutions by conservative interpretation
of the federal Constitution. Between 1972 and 1980, the Court reversed
twenty state supreme court decisions that ruled in favor of the individ-
ual on federal constitutional grounds. 21 The Court has held that while
state courts may not interpret the Bill of Rights more broadly than do
the federal courts, "a state is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions on policy than those the Court holds to be necessary
on Federal constitutional grounds. 22 When state courts have done so,
the Court has consistently refused to review these decisions, even when
the language of state and federal documents is identical or substantially
similar.23 Thus, the Court has clearly indicated that state courts can
insulate more protective civil liberties rulings from Supreme Court re-
view by basing them on state constitutional guarantees.
17. See Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 945 (1964); Karst,
Serrano v. Priest: .4 State Court's Responsibilities and Opportunities in the Development of
Federal Constitutional Law, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 720 (1972); Kramer & Riga, supra note 12.
18. See, e.g., Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1193
(1977). For discussions of the new judicial federalism, see Brennan, State Constitutions and
the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Collins, Away From a
Reactionary Approach to State Constitutions, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981); Douglas,
State JudicialActivism-The New Rolefor State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1123
(1977); Falk, Foreword- The State Constitution-A More Than ":4dequate" Nonfederal
Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273 (1973); Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the
Day ofthe Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 874 (1976); Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitu-
tions Seriously, 14 THE CENTER MAGAZINE 6 (198 1); Project Report: Toward an Activist Role
for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271 (1973); Note, Of Laboratories and
Liberties: State Court Protection of Political and Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REv. 533 (1976);
Note, The New Federalism: Toward.4 Principled Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29
STAN. L. REV. 297 (1977).
19. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 17
(1973). For a contrast between the Warren and Burger Courts' rulings in criminal justice
cases, see L. LEvy, AGAINST THE LAw: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974).
20. See notes 13 & 15 supra.
21. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REv. 379, 389 n.42 (1980).
22. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975) (emphasis added).
23. Linde, supra note 21, at 389.
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The Burger Court has directly encouraged the use of state court
forums by limiting access to federal forums for the adjudication of civil
liberties issues. In a series of cases, the Court revitalized the "equitable
abstention" doctrine as a barrier to removal from state to federal
courts,24 discouraged federal injunctive relief against the enforcement
of state law,' instituted limits on federal habeas corpus relief,26 and
imposed stricter standing limitations for raising claims in federal
courts.27 Taken together, these rulings have had the effect of shifting
responsibility for adjudicating constitutional and other federal claims
to state courts.
These decisions and the latitude they offer to state courts do not
necessarily undermine individual liberties. Commentators who ap-
plaud the new judicial federalism maintain that state courts, relying on
state constitutions, can indeed be counted on to step into the breach
created by the Burger Court.28 First, state bills of rights provide a solid
framework for judicial activism, and in many instances these guaran-
tees are more precise and detailed than are those contained in the fed-
eral Constitution. For example, whereas the First Amendment of the
federal Constitution protects generally the "free exercise" of religion2 9
and prohibits laws "respecting an establishment of religion, ' 30 various
state constitutions explicitly forbid religious exercises in public schools
and the use of funds for "any sectarian purpose."'" Second, rights not
mentioned in the federal Constitution are included in many state docu-
ments. Seventeen states have adopted "little ERA's,"3 2 and bills of
24. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
25. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
26. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
27. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). For an overview of Burger Court
decisions affecting access to the federal courts, see Yarbrough, Litigant Access Doctrine and
the Burger Court, 31 VAND. L. REv. 33 (1978).
28. See notes 8 & 17 supra.
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. I, § 1.
30. Id.
31. "About half the states prohibit the expenditure of public funds for various religious
purposes." Force, State 'Bills ofRights" A Case o/Neglect and the Needfor a Renaissance, 3
VAL. U.L. R.EV. 125, 138 (1969). See also C. ANTnEAu, P. CARROLL & T. BuRKE, RELIrION
UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1965).
32. State ERA's have been adopted in Alaska, ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (1972); Colo-
rado, COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 29 (1972); Connecticut, CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 20 (1974); Ha-
waii, HAWAII CONST. art. 1, § 21 (1972); Illinois, ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 18 (1971); Louisiana,
LA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (1974); Maryland, MD. CONST. art. 46 (1972); Massachusetts, MASS.
CONST. Pt. 1, art. 1 (1976); Montana, MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 4 (1973); New Hampshire,
N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 2 (1975); New Mexico, N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 18 (1973); Penn-
sylvania, PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28 (1971); Texas, TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 3a (1972); Utah, UTAH
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rights in ten states explicitly protect privacy.33 Third, even when a cat-
egory of rights is similar to rights protected under the federal Constitu-
tion, some states offer greater protection. For example, whereas the
federal Bill of Rights states that "cruel and unusual punishments"34
may not be employed, the Oregon Constitution requires in addition
that those arrested and confined may not be treated "with unnecessary
rigor.""5
Furthermore, state courts are not bound by the same constraints
that limit federal court activism. Federal courts must recognize consid-
erations of federalism as a limitation on their decisions; 36 state courts,
of course, need not. Moreover, federal court intervention is limited by
the justiciability doctrines concerning standing,37 political questions,38
and advisory opinions. State courts, on the other hand, tend to award
standing generously," intervene in even the most politically sensitive
areas,4 1 and, in ten states, issue advisory opinions. 42 However difficult
CONST. art. 4, § 1 (1896); Virginia, VA. CONST. art. 31, § 1 (1971); Washington, WASH.
CONST. art. 31, § 1 (1972); and Wyoming, Wyo. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (1890).
33. For a survey and discussion of state constitutional provisions protecting privacy, see
Note, Toward a Right of Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 631 (1977).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, § I.
35. OR. CONST. art. I, § 13. For analysis and application of the Oregon constitutional
provision, see Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981).
36. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 40-44 (1973).
37. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
38. See P. STRUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND "POLITICAL QUESTIONS"; A STUDY IN
JUDICIAL EvAsION (1974).
39. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 364 (1911).
40. See Collins & Meyers, The Public Interest Litigant in California: Observations on
Taxpayers Actions, Loy. L.A.L. REv. 329 (1977), and cases cited therein; Degnan, Forward-
Adequacy ofRepresentation in ClassActions, 60 CALIF. L. REy. 705 (1972); Delle, Donne &
Van Horn, Pennsylvania Class Actions: The Future in Light ofRecent Restrictions on Federal
Access?, 78 DICK. L. REV. 460 (1970); Note, State Class Actions, 27 S.C.L. REv. 87 (1975);
Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and a Summary, 69 YALE L.J. 895 (1960).
41. As a former New Jersey justice has noted: "In Asbury Park v. Woolley [an early
reapportionment case], people raised the political thicket argument contending that we
should stay out because the questions were too political, but they should have known better.
They should have known that no question was too political for us.... Decisions should
not change the law every year because there should be some stability; perhaps every five
years. But decisions must change the law sometime, because law is largely policy anyway."
R. LEHNE, THE QUEST FOR JUSTICE 43 (1978). The book discusses the politics of school
finance reform. See also Reitman v. Mulkey, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881
(1966), in which the California Supreme Court invalidated article one, § 26 of the California
Constitution, which was adopted as a result of Proposition 14 on the November, 1964 ballot.
Proposition 14, in essence, "not only disabled all branches of the state government from
establishing or enforcing open housing policies in the future, but it did so in language sug-
gesting that the 'right to discrimate' is a fundamental right .... " Karst & Horowitz, Reit-
man v. Mulkey: A Telephase of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SuP. CT. REv. 39, 41.
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it may be to draw the line between "judging" and "legislating," federal
courts are expected to refrain from crossing that border. In contrast,
"throughout the states," as Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court
has observed, "it is taken for granted that large areas of lawmaking are
left to the courts. 43
Considerable support for the new judicial federalism is result
oriented, stemming from desperation and last-ditch hope." Since the
Burger Court has made clear that it will not continue to expand civil
liberty protection under the federal Constitution, the mantle must fall
on the only shoulders available. Other support is more process
oriented. Justice Linde, for one, asserts that state courts should always
consult state law before considering a federal question. For example,
he maintains that no determination of whether or not a state has vio-
lated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment can be ren-
dered until state action has been completed. This occurs only after the
court decides whether or not the legislature or the executive has acted
in line with state law. The logic of constitutional law, according to
Justice Linde, demands that judgment on the federal constitutional
questions be postponed until state courts consult their state
constitutions.45
Some commentators, including judges, have questioned both the
wisdom and the propriety of "evading" the jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court by basing rulings on state constitutions. Two
critics of the California Supreme Court46-which has recently discov-
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). For a
general discussion of state court policymaking, see Jacob & Vines, State Courts and Public
Policy, in POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ch. 6 (1971).
For the view that some state court judges see themselves as active policymakers, see Vines,
The Judicial Role in the American States: An Exploration, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RE-
SEARCH (1969).
42. States that permit advisory opinions include Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Flor-
ida, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and South Car-
olina. During the school desegregation crisis, Governor Wallace requested opinions from
the Alabama Supreme Court as to the constitutionality of closing the schools rather than
complying with federal court orders. The response was affirmative.
43. Linde, Judges, Critics and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 248 (1972).
44. See Brennan, supra note 18; Falk, supra note 18; Project Report: Toward an Activist
Rolefor State Bills of Rights, supra note 18. See also Justice Marshall's dissent in Oregon v.
Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 726 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45. Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or. 611, 625 P.2d 123 (1981) (Linde, J., opinion); Linde, With-
out "Due Process' Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REv. 125, 133 (1970); Linde,
supra note 21.
46. Deukmejian & Thompson,,All Sail and No Anchor-Judicial Review Under the Cali-
fornia Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975 (1979). See also the dissents of Justice
Clark in People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 277, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637
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ered and ardently embraced its own constitution-observe that this re-
liance provides no protection against the federal government, the
"principal repository of power in the nation,"'47 but merely reallocates
power from state legislatures and executives to state courts. Further,
they believe that this practice is susceptible to abuse. First, it allows
state courts to engage in "constitution shopping" to avoid directives
from the Supreme Court. Second, the framers of many state constitu-
tions have provided little evidence of their intentions. State legislative
history does not place many constraints on state court interpretations.
Finally, the critics argue that reliance on state constitutions assumes,
with no basis in fact, that the states' interest in diversity outweighs the
national interest in uniformity. Indeed, selection of a state constitu-
tional ground, by foreclosing Supreme Court review, precludes
uniformity.
48
Other critics dismiss the new judicial federalism as largely rhetori-
cal. Professor Haas, for one, points out that court concern for individ-
ual rights has been conspicuously absent in prisoners' rights cases, an
area in which state court judges might be expected to be active.49 Even
in areas of state court activism, such as the protection of privacy rights,
only a few courts have realized the potential of the new judicial feder-
alism. Indeed, those most sanguine about the possibilities of state court
activism have been able to identify only a handful of courts that have
provided more extensive protections than has the United States
Supreme Court. 0 Although the activism of these "lighthouse courts" is
important, critics maintain that their activism is exceptional and does
(1976), and People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 940, 538 P.2d 237, 245, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109,
117 (1975), and the dissent of Justice Richardson in People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 117,
545 P.2d 272, 282, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (1976).
47. Deukmejian & Thompson, supra note 46, at 975.
48. Id
49. Haas, The New Federalism and Prisoners' Rights: State Courts in Comparative Per-
spective, 34 W. POL. Q. 552 (1981).
50. Professor Wilkes discovered that the courts in only seven states (California, Hawaii,
Indiana, Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) gave greater protection than the
federal courts in at least two cases. Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Proce-
dure, supra note 6,passim. Professor Howard, supra note 18, at 907, 916, 923, discovered
that only five courts offered greater protection in the area of religion (Delaware, Idaho,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and Wisconsin), three allowed it in the area of education (California,
Michigan, and New Jersey), and six allowed it in the area of personal autonomy (Alaska,
Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Mexico). For possible reasons for this
limited response to the Supreme Court's invitation to develop state constitutional law, see H.
GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS (1971); Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977); Wold, Political Orientations, Social Backgrounds and the Role
Perceptions of State Supreme Court Judges, 27 W. POL. Q. 239 (1974). See also Table A.
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not signal a broader state court concern with civil liberties.5
II. Gender Equality Litigation and the
New Judicial Federalism
The conflicting views of the new judicial federalism mentioned in
Part I have important implications for the protection of civil liberties.
To test the adequacy of these views, we focus here on federal and state
handling of selected gender equality issues. In addition to its intrinsic
importance, we have chosen to focus on gender equality for two rea-
sons--one substantive, the other theoretical.
First, the failure of many states to ratify the Equal Rights Amend-
ment,52 the United States Supreme Court's inconsistent response to
gender discrimination claims, 53 and the adoption of state "little
ERA's" 5 4 suggest that state rulings should assume increased signifi-
cance. Second, most discussions of the new judicial federalism relate to
the reliance on state constitutions in reaction to the Burger Court's ero-
sion of protections established by the Warren Court.5 Under this
view, state courts, looking to their own constitutions, have been able to
pick and choose among Supreme Court interpretations of similarly
worded provisions, "lodging rejected Supreme Court doctrines in state
constitutions and law."56 The Warren Court, however, did not address
the question of sex discrimination. Therefore, state decisions that go
beyond the rulings of the Burger Court represent independent initia-
tives. In this respect, gender equality differs from the issues, such as
51. Haas, supra note 49. For a critical view of state court capacity to protect civil liber-
ties, see Neuborne, supra note 50, at 1130-31.
52. Thirty-eight states must ratify the ERA by June, 1982. Of the 35 that have ratified,
Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, and Tennessee have rescinded, the constitutionality of which is
unclear. The states that have not yet ratified the ERA are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Virginia. For a discussion of the rocky course of
ratification, see J. BOLES, THE POLITICS OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT (1979).
53. The Supreme Court struck down sex-based classifications in Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7
(1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), but sustained permissible benign discrimination in Schlesinger v. Ballard,
419 U.S. 498 (1975), and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), and sustained all-male draft
registration in Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). For a critical view of the Court's
record in sex discrimination cases, see Baer, SexualEqualty and the Burger Court, 40 J. POL.
470 (1978). For a more sanguine view, published prior to Rostker, see Porter, Androgmny and
the Supreme Court, 23 WOMEN & POL. 1, 23 (1980-81).
54. See note 32 supra.
55. Collins, supra note 18.
56. Porter & Tarr, Editors' Introduction, in STATE SUPREME COURTS: POLICYMAKERS
IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM xx (1982).
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civil liberties, that are typically examined in assessing the new judicial
federalism and offers the opportunity to present a fresh perspective. As
Table A illustrates, gender activism and civil liberties activism are not
necessarily coextensive.
A. The Legal Framework
During the last two decades, state and federal governments have
been active in combating gender-based discrimination. At the national
level, noteworthy legislation includes the Equal Pay Act of 1963;17 Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,58 which addresses a variety of dis-
criminatory practices in hiring and promotion; and Title IX of the Edu-
cation Act Amendments of 1972, 59 which prohibits gender
discrimination in educational programs and activities receiving federal
financial assistance. In Reed v. Reed,6" the Supreme Court invalidated
a sex-based classification on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
grounds for the first time. Subsequent rulings, while failing to recog-
nize sex as a "suspect" classification, nevertheless indicated a continu-
ing judicial willingness to scrutinize sex-based classifications.6' In
keeping with these developments at the federal level, fourteen states
between 1968 and 1976 ratified state constitutional provisions guaran-
teeing gender equality,62 and several states undertook major revisions
of their laws to eliminate provisions and language that expressly or ef-
fectively discriminated against either sex.63
Although these parallel developments suggest a shared responsi-
bility between state and federal courts, the state role is much weaker.
Only a handful of states-most notably Pennsylvania, Illinois, Massa-
chusetts, Texas, and Washington--have employed state ERA's to
57. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
59. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976). Before Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677
(1979), which held that Title IX creates a private cause of action, litigants remedying sex
discrimination tended to rely on constitutional rather than on statutory grounds.
60. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
61. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), Justices Brennan, Douglas, White,
and Marshall found sex to be a suspect classification, but Justices Powell, Blackmun, and
Chief Justice Burger did not, pending the outcome of the ERA ratification. Id at 692 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring).
62. See note 32 supra.
63. For a listing of states that undertook major revisions of their statutes, see B. BROWN,
A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRiCE, WoMEN's RIGHTS AND THE LAW 47-51 (1977).
64. Despite their limited number, the decisions of the Washington courts are important
because they "have both preceded and exceeded federal standards" and because the Wash-
ington Supreme Court has apparently adopted a stringent absolute test for sex discrimina-
tion under its state ERA. Note, State Equal Rights Amendments: Legislative Reform and
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provide broad protection against sex discrimination.65 As Table B in-
dicates, state courts have decided relatively few cases on the basis of
state ERA's and in many of these cases have merely sustained gender-
based classifications against constitutional challenges. Most litigation
has been routed into federal courts, and most rulings have been based
on federal statutes and on the federal Constitution. As suggested by
Table C, this tendency toward federal dominance manifests itself even
in fields of traditional state responsibility, such as education. Federal
and state litigation pertaining to gender discrimination in interscholas-
tic athletics is illustrative of this tendency.
B. Gender Discrimination in Interscholastic Athletics
Athletic competition has traditionally been a male preserve, evi-
denced by the great disparity in the extent and quality of interscholastic
programs available to male and female athletes. Objections to this dis-
parity have been raised in both federal and state courts. Practices in
dispute include: 1) prohibitions against mixed participation on teams
in noncontact sports; 2) prohibitions against mixed participation on
teams in contact sports; 3) different sets of rules for men's and women's
teams competing in the same sport; and 4) "reverse discrimination"
suits brought by men seeking to participate on women's teams.
1. Mixed Participation in Noncontact Sports
At the beginning of the 1970's, interscholastic athletic associations,
which enrolled virtually all the states' high schools, did not permit
mixed team participation.66 Female plaintiffs sued to prevent the ap-
plication of rules that often had the effect of denying an opportunity to
participate in interscholastic competition in noncontact sports. Where
there was no comparable women's team, the federal courts consistently
JudicialActivism, 4 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 227, 228, 238 (1978). The limited litigation
under the state ERA is largely a product of legislative reform. Following the adoption of the
state ERA, the Washington state legislature undertook a major revision of state law to elimi-
nate sex discrimination, thereby removing many bases for litigation. WASHINGTON STATE
WOMEN'S COUNCIL, WOMEN AND THE LAW IN WASHINGTON STATE (1977) provides an
overview of this legislation.
65. To these gender-active states must be added California, which does not have an
ERA but which has recognized sex as a suspect classification. See Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby,
5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971).
66. The National Federation of State High School Associations at the beginning of the
1970's had advocated that women participate only on women's teams competing against
other women's teams. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF STATE HIGH SCHOOL ASSOCIATIONS,
1972-1973 OFFICIAL HANDBOOK 5 (1972). Although the National Federation could not
compel compliance by its members, most states had rules consistent with the Federation's
guidelines. Note, The Casefor Equality in Athletics, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 570, 571 (1973).
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struck down these rules on constitutional grounds.67 In the earliest
cases challenging exclusion, the courts concluded that the rules, as ap-
plied, failed to serve any legitimate purpose. The courts applied the
Reed v. Reed "rational relationship test," which held that there must be
a reasonable nexus between the state's objective and a statute that clas-
sifies on the basis of sex.6" These federal decisions served as precedent
for subsequent cases involving female exclusion from competition.
Despite these rulings, dicta in several opinions indicate that the
courts would have ruled differently if plaintiffs had the option of partic-
ipating on a women's team.69 When this issue was confronted directly,
federal courts upheld the constitutionality of separate teams for men
and women.70 Noting performance disparities between top male and
female athletes, one court concluded that such differences supported
fears that "unrestricted athletic competition between the sexes would
consistently lead to male domination of interscholastic sports and actu-
ally result in a decrease in female participation in such events," thereby
providing a rational basis for separate teams.7 ' Relying on similar con-
siderations, another court concluded that "'[s]eparate but equal' in the
realm of sports competition, unlike that of racial discrimination, is jus-
tifiable . "...72
State courts have been divided on the constitutionality of barring
mixed competition in noncontact sports. The Indiana Supreme Court
ruled that if there were no women's team in a sport, a ban on mixed
competition was discriminatory, since such a ban would effectively bar
female students from competition.73 Yet a Connecticut appellate court
dismissed an appeal of a lower court's refusal to enjoin the Connecticut
67. Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973); Leffel v. Wis-
consin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Carnes v. Tennes-
see Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Gilpin v. Kansas
State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973); Brenden v. Independ-
ent School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn. 1972), a'd, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973);
Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972).
68. In Reed v. Reed, the Court noted, "A 'classification' must be reasonable, not arbi-
trary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike." 404 U.S. at 76.
69. See, e.g., Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233,
1242-43 (D. Kan. 1973); Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224, 1233-34
(D. Minn. 1972).
70. See, e.g., Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Bucha
v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. IlM. 1972).
71. Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69, 75 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
72. Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930, 932 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
73. Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972).
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Interscholastic Athletic Conference from enforcing rules making cross-
country running available to men but not to women.74 Although the
basis for this dismissal was not stated, the trial court justified its ruling
by maintaining that mixed-sex competition ignored important physical
differences, destroyed the incentive of male athletes to compete, and
violated the traditions of the athletic world.7"
A Pennsylvania court, relying on its own ERA, demonstrated the
potential of the new judicial federalism by extending greater protection
to women athletes than had the federal courts.76 Although both state
and federal grounds were proposed for overturning a rule that denied
equal athletic opportunities to women, the court noted that the state
ERA was sufficient for summary disposal of the issue. This amend-
ment, the court held, clearly prohibited exclusion of women from
sports in which men can participate. Merely to provide men's and wo-
men's teams in a sport, however, would not be sufficient under the
ERA, since this might deny the most talented women an opportunity to
compete at the level that their abilities would otherwise permit; exclu-
sion of women from the men's team was therefore unconstitutional as
well.7 7 Under the federal rational basis test, separate-but-equal teams
would most likely be permitted; however, because of the more stringent
standard under the state constitution, the federal question was never
reached.
2 Exclusion of Women From Contact Sports
Although the cases in this category raise issues similar to those
previously discussed, their resolution is complicated by the inevitable
physical contact on mixed-sex teams and the increased possibility of
injury in contact sports. Perhaps because of these considerations, fed-
eral courts initially were reluctant to endorse female participation in
contact sports, particularly on mixed teams. In two instances, for ex-
ample, the courts expressly limited their rulings to noncontact sports.7 8
More recently, federal courts have consistently ruled that exclusion of
women from contact sports in which men are allowed to participate
74. Hollander v. Connecticut Interscholastic Athletic Conference, 164 Conn. 654, 295
A.2d 671 (1972).
75. The trial court's ruling is discussed in Comment, Sex Discrimination in Interscholas-
tic High School Athletics, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 535, 543 (1974).
76. Packel v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334 A.2d
839 (1975).
77. Id at 52, 334 A.2d at 842.
78. Morris v. Michigan State Board of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973); Gilpin v.
Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973).
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violates the Constitution.7 9 As one court noted, the risk of injury to
women cannot be used to justify their exclusion, since frail men, who
undergo the same risk of injury, are not excluded.A0 Only once, how-
ever, did a court conclude that qualified women could not be denied
equal access to the men's team.8 ' In three cases, the courts suggested-
generally in dicta-that separate teams in contact sports for women sat-
isfied the constitutional requirement.82
State court decisions have gone considerably beyond their federal
counterparts. In Packel v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic .4thletic 4ssocia-
lion,83 the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court noted that although the
complainant had specifically exempted football and wrestling, "it is ap-
parent that there can be no valid reason for excepting those two sports
from our order in this case.'" 84 Two subsequent cases followed the
Packel lead. The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated in an advisory
opinion that a statute that would prohibit all participation of women
with men in football and wrestling violated the state's ERA. 5 The
Washington Supreme Court ruled that a qualified woman could not be
excluded from men's teams in either contact or noncontact sports, re-
gardless of the existence of women's teams.8 6 After noting that the fed-
eral Constitution merely required that gender classifications have a
"rational basis," the court observed that it was not bound by federal
precedent in the interpretation of analogous state provisions. Earlier
decisions interpreting Washington's equal protection clause, the court
noted, had established that sex was a suspect classification, which could
only be used to promote compelling state interests. Since the later rati-
fication of the state's ERA was intended to have some independent ef-
fect, the court held that the provision was meant to impose an even
more rigorous standard for evaluating sexual classifications. Viewed in
79. Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis.
1978); Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n,
443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977);
Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
80. Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569, 571 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976).
81. Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n,
443 F. Supp. 753, 758-59 (S.D. Ohio 1978).
82. Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117, 1122 (E.D.
Wis. 1978); Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 170-72 (D. Colo. 1977); Cames v.
Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569, 571-72 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
83. 18 Pa. Commw. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975).
84. Id at 53, 334 A.2d at 843.
85. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 374 Mass. 836, 371 N.E.2d
426 (1977).
86. Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
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this light, the exclusion of women from sports teams, even in contact
sports, could not stand. 7
3. Different Rules for Women's and Men's Competition
In some states, different rules govern men's and women's competi-
tion in the same sport. Litigants have attacked the restrictive rules of
women's basketball before federal courts on three occasions. In two
decisions, the courts have rejected these challenges, maintaining that
the detriment to female players was de minimis and that sex-based rules
reflected differences in physical characteristics and capabilities.88 In
the other decision, the court upheld such a challenge, asserting that the
restrictive rules prevented female basketball players from fully devel-
oping their skills, and that there was no substantial relationship be-
tween the purported objectives of the rules and the sex-based
classification used to achieve those objectives.8 9
4. Reverse Discrimination
Three recent cases have raised the question of whether or not a
qualified male has a right to play on an all-female athletic team when
the school offers no separate male team. A federal court avoided the
constitutional question by construing Title IX to require schools to of-
fer the same athletic opportunities to all students.90 Courts in both Illi-
nois and Massachusetts addressed the constitutional question, although
they differed markedly in their approach to it.
The Illinois court upheld an Illinois High School Association rule
prohibiting male participation on a women's volleyball team.91 Focus-
ing first on the federal constitutional question, the court noted that the
Supreme Court's decision in Craig v. Boren92 supplied the applicable
standard: Gender-based classifications "must serve important govern-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives." 93 The objective of the rule was undoubtedly legiti-
mate: to protect and enhance the athletic opportunities of female ath-
letes. Moreover, the gender classification imposed no stigma on
87. Id at 875, 877-78, 540 P.2d at 891-92.
88. Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1977);
Jones v. Oklahoma Secondary School Activities Ass'n, 453 F. Supp. 150 (W.D. Okla. 1977).
89. Dodson v. Arkansas Activities Ass'n, 468 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
90. Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.R.I.), vacatedas
moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979).
91. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 IMl. App. 3d 980, 394 N.E.2d 855 (1979).
92. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
93. Id at 197.
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excluded male athletes, since "there is a long-standing tradition in
sports of setting up classifications whereby persons having objectively
measured characteristics likely to make them more proficient are elimi-
nated from certain classes of competition."9 On the other hand, since
typical physical advantages would permit men to dominate if male par-
ticipation were extensive, allowing men to compete on the women's
volleyball team would diminish the athletic opportunities of female
athletes. Although alternative modes of classification might be pro-
posed, only a gender-based classification, the court held, adequately
addressed the problem of physical advantage.95
Whereas the Illinois court took its bearings primarily from the fed-
eral Constitution, the Massachusetts court, which grounded its ruling in
the state constitution, held that the state ERA required that gender
classifications be subject to the same strict scrutiny that federal courts
apply to racial classifications.96 Appellants in the case argued that the
classification merely reflected physical differences, that the exclusion of
males safeguarded participants against injury, and that the rule pro-
tected women's sports from inundation by male participants. The court
countered as follows: Since separation by sex was, at best, an imprecise
proxy for differences in size, weight, and strength, the justifications for
the rules were inadequate. Appellants' claims rested on a stereotype of
female fragility and, further, could not be applied to such sports as
swimming and golf. In those sports in which male physical advantages
are minimal or nonexistent, fears of male preponderance or domina-
tion are unfounded. The male exclusion, the court rather sternly con-
cluded, "represents a sweeping use of a disfavored classification when
less offensive and better calculated alternatives appear to exist and
have not been attempted." 97
The cases involving gender discrimination in interscholastic athlet-
ics illustrate the possibilities and limitations of the new judicial federal-
ism. The Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Washington courts did rely
on state constitutional guarantees, not only to develop their own stan-
dards for evaluating gender discrimination claims, but also to provide
more extensive protections for female athletes than those accorded by
the federal courts. The Massachusetts Supreme Court based its reverse
discrimination decision squarely on the state constitution. Nonetheless,
94. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 111. App. 3d 980, 988, 394 N.E.2d 855, 861
(1979).
95. Id at 988-89, 394 N.E.2d at 862-63.
96. Attorney General v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 378 Mass. 342,
393 N.E.2d 284 (1979).
97. Id at 360, 393 N.E.2d at 294.
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these cases taken as a whole highlight some of the problems inherent in
the new judicial federalism.
First, the existence of applicable state constitutional provisions
does not guarantee that state courts will base their decisions on those
provisions. In the Indiana case, the appellant raised both state and fed-
eral claims, but the state supreme court confined its analysis to the fed-
eral constitutional issue and concluded, more or less as an afterthought,
that the protection afforded by the state constitution was identical to
that under the federal provision.98 In the Illinois case, the Illinois court
focused on the federal issue and failed to provide a principled interpre-
tation of its own ERA provision.99
Second, despite the protection afforded by state constitutions, liti-
gants have tended to use federal courts and federal constitutional and
statutory arguments to litigate their discrimination claims. Of the
twenty cases involving gender discrimination in interscholastic athlet-
ics, only six were contested in state courts. Indeed, even when the state
constitution expressly banned gender discrimination, litigants have
twice chosen the federal forum."° This tendency to use the federal
courts has not diminished with the development of the new judicial
federalism; of the cases initiated since 1976, seven out of ten have been
commenced in the federal courts. Justice Linde observed the reason:
"[T]he habit that developed in the 1960's of making a federal case of
every claim and looking for all law in Supreme Court opinions dies
hard." 01
IIL Gender Equality Litigation in State Courts
The state courts' constitutional decisions, however, do not tell the
whole story. Conclusions that state courts have been civil libertarian
laggards are as wide of the mark as are claims that they have been civil
liberties activists. Both contentions fail to take note of the day-to-day
business of state appellate courts and, by looking at them through a
federal prism, reduce them to miniatures of their federal counterparts.
This oversimplified picture of state court actions underestimates the
range of state court activism and policymaking affecting civil
98. Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 526, 289 N.E.2d 495,
501 (1972).
99. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 IM. App. 3d 980, 996-97, 394 N.E.2d 855,
864-65 (1979).
100. Hoover v. Meiklejoln, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977); Bucha v. Illinois High
School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69 (N.D. IM. 1972).
101. Linde, supra note 21, at 390.
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liberties.
10 2
State courts are in a position to contribute to the protection of in-
dividual liberties in four distinguishable ways. The first and most obvi-
ous way is through decisions interpreting state and federal
constitutional guarantees. Statutory interpretation provides the second
route. Since state constitutions are not grants of power, but are consid-
ered limitations on a comprehensive residual governing power, 10 3 state
legislatures often do not need to resort to constitutional amendment to
enact policies of constitutional significance affecting individual
rights. 104 When states have elected to safeguard rights, through broad
legislative enactments, state courts have the opportunity to make im-
portant contributions to the protection of individual rights by broadly
construing general statutory language. For example, in Massachusetts
Electric Co. v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ,105 the
Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that a Massachusetts statute for-
bidding sex discrimination in employment prohibited exclusion of
pregnancy-related disabilities from disability benefits. The court con-
strued the state statute to provide protection unavailable under federal
constitutional and statutory law.1"s Third, through their power to es-
tablish rules of evidence, state supreme courts can have a profound ef-
fect on safeguarding defendants' rights in state courts. For example,
despite a contrary United States Supreme Court ruling in Kirby v. Illi-
nois, °7 the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that defendants in the state
were entitled to legal assistance at pretrial line-ups. The court based its
decision explicitly on its "constitutional power to establish rules of evi-
dence." 108 Finally, through their development of the common law,
state courts make policy that tremendously affects individual liberty.
Consortium cases in particular present a striking example of how state
courts have, in an unheralded way, promoted the equality of the sexes.
102. For a typology of state supreme court policymaking, see Porter & Tarr, supra note
56, at xvi-xviil.
103. See, e.g., Client Follow-up Co. v. Hynes, 75 111. 2d 208, 215, 390 N.E.2d 847, 849-50
(1979); State ex rel Schneider v. Kennedy, 225 Kan. 13, 20, 587 P.2d 844, 850 (1978).
104. Press shield laws furnish an example of states using legislation rather than constitu-
tional amendment to enact policies of constitutional significance. For a survey of this legis-
lation, see D. O'BRIEN, THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 183-84 (1981).
105. 375 Mass. 160, 375 N.E.2d 1192 (1978).
106. Id at 165-72, 375 N.E.2d at 1197-1201. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976).
107. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
108. People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 338-39, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27-28 (1974).
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A. Recovery for Loss of Consortium
Consortium is defined as the "[c]onjugal fellowship of husband
and wife, and right of each to the company, society, co-operation, affec-
tion and aid of the other in every conjugal relation."' 0 9 Under com-
mon law, husbands were permitted to recover for negligence leading to
an impairment or loss of the consortium of their spouses, but wives
were not." 0 This disparate treatment of husbands' and wives' claims
stemmed from the more general legal inequality of women, reflecting
the common law's legal fusion of husband and wife. Since wives were
not legally entitled to their husbands' services, it was argued, they
could not secure redress for the loss of those services. Despite the criti-
cisms of legal commentators, this remained the ruling doctrine in all
states until the 1950's."'
The federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pro-
vided the stimulus for reconsidering the traditional common law posi-
tion. It ruled in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co. I2 that wives in Washington,
D.C. could recover for negligent loss of consortium. The court noted
that the common law rule stemmed from an outmoded conception of
the marital relationship.' 1" In addition, the court observed that most of
the practical arguments offered for denying to wives a right to re-
cover-for example, the possibility of double recovery, the indirectness
of the injury, and its remote and inconsequential character-applied
equally to a right of recovery for husbands. Since these difficulties did
not justify denial of a husband's right to recover, they should not block
extension of this right to wives." 4 Finally, the court observed that the
common law already permitted wives to collect damages for some in-
terferences with the marital relationship, e.g., alienation of affections,
and concluded that in light of the "demonstrable desirability" of a
change in the rule and the unconvincing justifications for its retention,
a wife's right to recover for negligent invasion of consortium should be
recognized." 15
109. BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 280 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
110. For general background on the consortium issue, see Note, Judicial Treatment of
Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 COLuM. L. REv. 1341 (1961).
111. A Noith Carolina court did recognize a wife's right to sue for negligent invasion of
consortium in Hipp v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921). This
decision, however, was explicitly overruled in Hinnant v. Tide Water Power Co., 189 N.C.
120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
112. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950).
113. Id at 816.
114. ld at 815.
115. ld at 819.
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The Hitaffer decision stimulated considerable litigation aimed at
overturning state decisions prohibiting wives from recovering for negli-
gent loss of consortium. Initially, at least, these efforts usually failed.
As Table D indicates, during the decade following Hitaffer, twenty-
four state appellate courts considered consortium claims, but only
seven granted wives a right to recover. 1 6 Most of these courts dis-
missed the Hitaffer opinion as unpersuasive, although none attempted
a detailed refutation. Rather, most emphasized that the common law
had long ago settled the issue and that the doctrine of stare decisis re-
quired adherence to the common law rule. I7 In this regard, they noted
that few state courts had immediately endorsed Hitaffer and used this
lack of acceptance to buttress their contention that the common law
was not in doubt."' In addition, some courts insisted that recognition
of a wife's right to recover would introduce serious practical
problems." 9 Other courts concluded that the notion of damages for
loss of consortium, whether awarded to wives or to husbands, was alto-
gether outmoded. 120 Finally, several courts emphasized that the limita-
tions of the judicial function precluded such "judicial legislation" and
asserted that the legislature should institute whatever change was re-
quired in the traditional doctrine.' 2 '
Over time, more courts adopted the Hitaffer position, and the jus-
tifications offered for the traditional rule faded. Nonetheless, some
courts continued to insist that the weight of authority supported denial
of wives' claims to recover. 22  Other courts maintained that factors
116. For denial of consortium claims, see Table D under Alabama, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
For recognition of consortium claims, see Table D under Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois,
Iowa, Michigan, Oregon, and South Dakota.
117. In Jeune v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954), for example,
the Arizona Supreme Court noted, "[W]e have no right to remake the common law as was
attempted in Hitaffer v. Argonne Co ...... Id at 228, 269 P.2d at 724. See also note 128
infra.
118. See, e.g., Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960);
Coastal Tank Lines, Inc. v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82 (1955).
119. See, e.g., Deshotel v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d
449 (1958).
120. See id; Neuberg v. Bobowicz, 401 Pa. Super. 146, 162 A.2d 662 (1960).
121. See, e.g., Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 122 So. 2d 153 (1960);
Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952); Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954); Nickel v. Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205
(1955).
122. See Table D under Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and
Wyoming.
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peculiar to their state required retention of the traditional rule. The
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, for example, noted that the
state constitution incorporated common law and interpreted this to
mean that it was obliged to uphold established common law principles
unless they were modified by the legislature."2 Still other courts main-
tained that the unavoidability of double recovery and other practical
problems justified their refusal to extend to wives a right to recover. 124
Finally, several courts, noting the division of opinion, concluded that
since the proper resolution of the issue was in doubt, the legislature
should decide whether or not a change in the law was warranted. 125
This deference to legislative authority, often combined with extrava-
gant professions of judicial modesty, is a recurring theme in the deci-
sions after 1960 that rejected the extension of a right to recover.
126
The seven state appellate courts that recognized a wife's right to
recover for negligent loss of consortium in the decade following Hitaf-
fer relied heavily on the analysis in that decision. Indeed, one court
included almost seven pages of Hitaffer, verbatim, in its opinion. 127
Several courts that rejected Hiaffer acknowledged the desirability of its
holding but professed to be bound by precedent. Therefore, these
seven courts are distinguished by their willingness to abandon the com-
mon law rule.128 Whereas most courts viewed the common law as dis-
positive, these courts claimed that their paramount responsibility was
"to do justice, not to perpetuate error." 129 Whereas most courts main-
tained that any change in the law should come from the legislature,
these courts insisted that an "essential function" of the courts is "re-
123. Seagraves v. Legg, 147 W. Va. 331, 127 S.E.2d 605 (1962).
124. See, e.g., Hoffiman v. Dautel, 192 Kan. 406, 388 P.2d 615 (1964); Roseberry v.
Starkovitch, 73 N.M. 211, 387 P.2d 321 (1963).
125. See, e.g., Potter v. Schafter, 161 Me. 340, 211 A.2d 891 (1965); Bates v. Donnafield,
481 P.2d 347 (Wyo. 1971).
126. See, e.g., Karriman v. Orthopedic Clinic, 488 P.2d 1250, 1251 (Okla. 1971) ("We
feel that we should follow Oklahoma precedent and are of the view that if the present policy
in dealing with the problem before us is to be changed it should be done by the legislature,
as representatives of the people, and not by this court"); Bates v. Donnafield, 481 P.2d 347,
349 (Wyo. 1971) ("We think it far more salutary and in the overall more equitable that the
common law which we have adopted in this jurisdiction be changed by legislative
enactment")..
127. Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953).
128. State appellate judges have, in both opinions and other writings, expressed widely
divergent views about the respect that should be accorded to precedent. See Cameron, The
Placefor JudicialActivism on the Part of a State's Highest Court, 4 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.
279 (1973); Day, Why Judges Must Make Law, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 563 (1976); Leflar,
supra note 7; Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 3 (1966); Tate, The Law-
Making Function of the Judge, 28 LA. L. REv. 211 (1968).
129. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 38, 101 N.W.2d 227, 229 (1960).
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evaluating common-law concepts in the light of present-day reali-
ties.""3 The Michigan Supreme Court forthrightly summarized the
view of the judicial function that united the courts endorsing Hitaffer
and separated them from their sister courts. "We are remitted, then, to
a matter of sound judicial policy, a decision to be reached in the light
of today's society and the current common law solution of comparable
problems."''
The last two decades have witnessed a major shift in state courts'
receptiveness to wives' consortium claims. Six courts reversed earlier
rulings as a result of legislative action granting a right of recovery to
wives.' 32 Three others extended this right themselves, following ratifi-
cation of "little ERA's" in their states.133 Finally, courts in eleven
states, addressing the issue for the first time since Hitaffer, ruled that
the common law permits a right of recovery;134 courts in ten other
states reversed earlier decisions to endorse that position. 135
This shift reflected a change in perspective that, once begun, was
self-perpetuating. As the California Supreme Court observed, in over-
ruling past decisions and recognizing a wife's right to recover, it was
bound by the common law, but the common law had shifted under its
feet.' 36 Once the weight of authoritative opinion began to shift as a
result of persuasive judicial opinion and virtually unanimous scholarly
commentary, even those courts that had been reluctant to pioneer in
changing the law could claim that they were bound by prevailing au-
thority. Indeed, this reliance on authority to justify policy change was
a salient element in most decisions after 1965. The experiences of
states that extended protection to wives undermined claims that this
would produce intractable practical problems. By demonstrating that
remedies could be developed for problems of double recovery and ac-
130. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 429, 170 N.E.2d 881, 892 (1960).
131. Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 46, 101 N.W.2d 227, 233 (1960).
132. See Table D under Colorado, Kansas, Mississippi, New Hampshire, Oregon, and
Tennessee.
133. See Table D under Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington.
134. See Table D under Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, and Rhode Island.
135. See Table D under Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin. For discussions of these developments,
see Clark, The Wif Action for Negligent Impairment of Consortium, 3 FAM. L.Q. 197
(1969); Comment, A Wife's Right to Recoverfor Loss of Consortium, 2 CuM.-SAM. L. Rv.
189 (1971); Comment, The Negligent Impairment of Consortium-A Timefor Recognition as a
Cause of Action in Texas, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 864 (1976).
136. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr.
765 (1974).
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curate calculation of damages, these states helped overcome the reluc-
tance of other states to adopt the Hitaffer rule.
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of these decisions was the
courts' willingness to take an active role in charting a new policy direc-
tion. In sharp contrast to the courts that upheld the traditional rule,
those that followed Hiaffer voiced few reservations about preempting
legislative action. If they addressed the issue at all, they merely as-
serted that courts were responsible for the developments of common
law.137  These activist sentiments may indicate that state appellate
courts are divided about what role they should play in updating the
common law. It is more likely, however, that this difference stems from
an awareness that other courts had already pioneered in the field,
thereby establishing the propriety of judicial policymaking. It is note-
worthy that these activist sentiments on occasion came from courts that
had earlier professed the need for legislative deference.1
38
Several observations may be drawn from an analysis of these
cases. First, it was a federal court-not a state court-that provided the
initial impetus for reconsidering the common law on negligent invasion
of consortium. Indeed, for over a decade after Hitaffer, state courts
generally relied on the rationale in that case to justify decisions estab-
lishing a wife's right to recover. In this field of traditional state con-
cern, then, state initiative in support of gender equality depended upon
earlier federal judicial intervention. Second, reservations about the
proper scope of judicial policymaking played a major role in circum-
scribing state court efforts to remedy this instance of gender discrimina-
tion. Although several courts expressed misgivings about the
traditional common law rule after Hitaffer,3 9 in the ten years following
that decision, only a few felt it proper to recognize a wife's right to
recover. Even after the weight of judicial opinion had swung in favor
of Hitaffer, some courts still felt bound to uphold the traditional rule in
the absence of legislative action. 40 Finally, the adoption of "little
ERA's" in seventeen states did not play a significant role in overturning
137. In Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., for example, the California Supreme Court
noted, "Although the legislature may of course speak to the subject, in the common law
system the primary instruments of this evolution are the courts, adjudicating on a regular
basis the rich variety of individual cases brought before them." 12 Cal. 3d 382, 394, 525 P.2d
669, 676, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 772 (1974).
138. Compare, e.g., City of Glendale v. Bradshaw, 108 Ariz. 582, 503 P.2d 803 (1972),
with Jeune v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954).
139. See, e.g., Smith v. United Constr. Workers, 271 Ala. 42, 43-44, 122 So. 2d 153, 154-
55 (1960); Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So. 2d 420,423 (Fla. 1952); Hdffinan v. Dautel, 192 Kan. 406,
412-16, 388 P.2d 615, 620-24 (1964).
140. See note 125 and accompanying text supra.
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the traditional common law rule. In five of the "little ERA" states,
ratification of the constitutional guarantee occurred after the establish-
ment of a wife's right to recover. 41 In six of the remaining states with
constitutional guarantees, courts continued to deny wives a right to re-
cover. 142 In one state, the issue was never litigated 1 43 and in three
others, courts subsequently recognized the right."14 In only three in-
stances, however, did state courts base their recognition of this right on
their state constitutions.
45
In the consortium cases, state appellate courts generally relied on
their power to update the common law to eliminate an outmoded ele-
ment in tort law. In replacing the previous judge-made rule with one
more consistent with contemporary mores, the courts promoted the
equality of the sexes. While this change may not have resulted from a
grand judicial design, the effect of the consortium rulings-like that of
many other common law rulings-has been to create a more equitable
social order and to expand individual liberties.
Updating the common law is not the only means by which state
courts achieve results. Through statutory interpretation, either alone or
in conjunction with common law policymaking, state appellate courts
also contribute-again, at times inadvertently-to the protection of in-
dividual liberties. The changing law of custody in the states provides a
further illustration of predominantly nonconstitutional decisions that
have resulted in greater sexual equality.
B. Child Custody-The "Tender Years Doctrine"
Until the mid-nineteenth century, American courts were influ-
enced by, but did not always follow, the English common law practice
of awarding custody to fathers in divorce cases. Gradually, legislatures
and courts indicated increasing concern with the welfare of the child. 146
Changes in the legal status of married women 147 and the development
141. See Table D under Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Montana.
142. See Table D under Connecticut, Louisiana, New Mexico, Utah, Virginia, and
Wyoming.
143. See Table D under Hawaii.
144. See Table D under Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington.
145. See note 133 supra. In Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974), the Alaska
Supreme Court mentioned the state's ERA in a footnote, but nevertheless based its ruling on
the common law.
146. See Foster & Freed, L!fe with Father 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 325-29 (1978).
147. Comment, The Father's Right to Child Custody in Interparental Disputes, 49 TUL. L.
Rv. 189 (1974).
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of theories about the needs of very young children 4 8 and about wo-
men's essential nurturing function 14 9 produced further shifts in judicial
practice. From the early 1900's to the 1960's, courts consistently denied
paternal claims, praising maternal "sympathy" and "constant ministra-
tions,"'150 discerning "but a twilight zone between a mother's love and
the atmosphere of heaven."'' Less sentimental courts confined them-
selves to noting that there are "biological connections between mother
and child" 52 and that mothers, not fathers, lactate.'5 3 This preference
for maternal custody, particularly for preschool children, found judi-
cial expression in the "tender years" doctrine. 154 The maternal prefer-
ence is not absolute, since courts are bound to consider the "best
interests of the child,"'155 but the very vagueness of that requirement
gives an advantage to the mother. In some jurisdictions, the doctrine is
employed as a "tie breaker"156-- when both parents are found "fit,"'
1 57
the award, "all else being equal,"' 58 is made to the mother.
The tender years doctrine has long been attacked by behavioral
scientists, social workers, and practitioners of family law, all of whom
maintain that it is nothing more than a shortcut employed in lieu of the
careful case-by-case investigation necessary for determining the best in-
terest of the child. 15 9 Some courts also have questioned the doctrine,
pointing out that it is premised 'on traditional assumptions about fe-
male and male divisions of responsibility and therefore is not applica-
ble when mothers work outside the home.' 60 The Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act (UMDA) of 1971161 has eroded the doctrine, for al-
though it does not provide for laws prohibiting preference based on
148. Kurtz, The State Equal Rights Amendments and Their Impact on Domestic Relations
Law, 11 FAM. L.Q. 101, 138-39 (1977); Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody Awards: Legal
Standards and Empirical Patternsfor Child Custody, Support and Visitation After Divorce, 12
U.C.D. L. REv. 474, 481 (1979).
149. Kurtz, supra note 148, at 135-37; Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 148, at 478-79.
150. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 173 Wis. 592, 595, 181 N.W. 826, 827 (1921).
151. Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938).
152. Bruce v. Bruce, 141 Okla. 161, 167-68, 285 P. 30, 37 (1930).
153. Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 329, 517 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1974).
154. Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 329-30; Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 148.
155. Kurtz, supra note 148, at 138.
156. Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 329, 331.
157. Id at 329; Jones, The Tender Years Doctrine: Survey and Analysis, 16 J. FAM. L.
695, 699 (1978).
158. Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 331.
159. See id at 331-32, 340; Jones, supra note 157, at 736-37; Roth, The Tender Years
Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423 (1977).
160. Stanfield v. Stanfield, 435 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Mo. Ct. App. 1968); State ex rel Watts
v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 181, 350 N.Y.S.2d, 285, 288 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973).
161. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DivoRcE AcT § 402 (1971).
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sex, and may even be viewed as endorsing the doctrine, 6 2 it establishes
such precise guidelines for determining the "best interest" that it casts
serious doubts on the doctrine's preference for mothers.
63
Thirty-five states have adopted the UMDA either in whole or in
part or have used it as a model."6 In none of these states do custody
statutes stipulate any form of maternal preference.' 65 By the mid-to-
late 1970's, a preponderance of states had revised their custody laws to
give equal rights to both parents, to specificallyforbid preference based
on the sex of either parent, or to establish fairly detailed "best interest"
standards. A few states give courts wide discretion in making awards.
Although there is no way of knowing to what extent the UMDA, state
reforms, the growing divorce rate, the increasing number of women in
the workforce, and changing attitudes toward male and female roles in
general and toward parenting in particular are responsible, it now ap-
pears that fathers are more willing to seek custody and are more suc-
cessful in obtaining it.'
66
Although the tender years doctrine has fallen into disrepute, it is
still utilized in some jurisdictions as a "tie breaker,'""b? and in others as
a rebuttable presumption; 68 that is, the father may present evidence
that he is the better parent. More importantly, it is, in the minds of
many judges, equated with "best interest."'' 69 The doctrine's vitality is
reinforced by a reluctance to reverse trial judges' awards in these ex-
ceedingly difficult cases. It is often impossible to determine the extent
to which a trial judge is influenced by gender, and an appellate court
will not reverse in favor of the father unless a trial judge has clearly
abused his or her discretionary authority. Commentators agree that
case law has yet to catch up with "black letter" law. 7' Table E, which
refers mainly to appellate courts, may present only the tip of the
iceberg.
In addition to the dubious relationship between "tender years"
and "best interest," the tender years doctrine is inherently gender bi-
162. See Jones, supra note 157, at 723.
163. B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ & A. PRICE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE LAW
189 (1977).
164. See Table E under column entitled "Statute." See also Freed & Foster, Divorce in
the Fifty States: An Overview as of 1978, 13 FAM. L.Q. 105, 121-23 (1979).
165. Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 338.
166. See Comment, supra note 147.
167. See Table E under Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, South Dakota, Utah, and Virginia.
See also Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 332.
168. See Table E under Alabama and Wyoming. See also Jones, supra note 157, at 699.
169. Kurtz, supra note 148, at 138; Jones, supra note 157, at 700-01.
170. Roth, supra note 159, at 433-38. See also Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 332-33.
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ased. Not only does it disadvantage fathers, but it imposes hardships
and psychological burdens on mothers who do not want or should not
have the custody of their children. It is argued that the doctrine, unless
justified by a "compelling" reason for its continued use (and this would
be hard to imagine), would be found unconstitutional under the pro-
posed federal Equal Rights Amendment. Indeed, it is doubtful that it
would survive under the United States Supreme Court's "heightened
ends and means scrutiny" test announced in Craig v. Boren, 1' or even
the "rational basis" test enunciated in Reed v. Reed.12 Furthermore,
the Court has ruled that under most circumstances, fathers of illegiti-
mate children have the same rights as mothers.' 7 3  Nevertheless, the
Court has three times refused to decide whether or not the doctrine
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. 74 This aspect of family law thus
remains-at least at present-an exclusively state concern.
1. The Tender Years Doctrine in "Little ERA" States
It is argued that the doctrine cannot pass muster under state
ERA's, whether courts employ "strict scrutiny," which the proposed
federal ERA would require, or the "intermediate" or "minimal" scru-
tiny utilized in Craig and Reed. As Table F indicates, the doctrine has
been challenged on constitutional grounds in seven of the seventeen
"little ERA" states. '7 It was invalidated in Illinois,
17 6 in Maryland, 177
and in Pennsylvania 178 and was significantly modified in Utah, the only
state that, at one time, legislatively endorsed the doctrine; 179 it was sus-
tained in Louisiana'80 and in Virginia. 181 Although the Colorado
Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the doctrine be-
cause the case provided insufficient evidence of gender bias, courts in
171. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
172. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
173. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
174. Davis v. Davis, 306 Minn. 536, 235 N.W.2d 836 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 943
(1976); Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d 1271 (Okla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 863 (1978); Arends
v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 517 P.2d 1019, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
175. See Table F under Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia,
and Utah.
176. State ex rel. Elmore v. Elmore, 46 IM. App. 3d 504, 361 N.E.2d 615 (1977).
177. McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978).
178. Commonwealth ex rel Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977).
179. Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975), held that mothers have no absolute right to
custody under the state constitution. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (Supp. 1981) now rejects a
promateral presumption.
180. Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
181. McCreery v. McCreery, 218 Va. 352, 237 S.E.2d 167 (1977).
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that state by then had ceased to rely on the doctrine." 2 Courts in the
remaining "little ERA" states have not been presented with the consti-
tutional question. The doctrine is still used in Montana as a "tie
breaker, '  and, although the case law following recent statutory
changes is still unsettled, it is also apparently used in New Hamp-
shire, 84 New Mexico,185 and Wyoming' as a rebuttable presumption.
It thus appears that constitutional guarantees of gender equality have
little bearing on a doctrine that reflects a "baggage of sexual
stereotypes."
8 7
It also appears that on this issue there is little difference in the
"little ERA" states among activist, gender-activist, and passive
courts.'8 8 The activist Pennsylvania Supreme Court, questioning "the
legitimacy of a doctrine that is predicated upon traditional or stere-
otypical roles of men and women," found the doctrine "offensive to the
concept of the equality of the sexes" that the-court "had embraced as a
constitutional principle." '89 The intermittently activist and gender-ac-
tivist courts in Illinois and Maryland have also invalidated the doctrine
on the basis of their state constitutions.' 90 Even the conservative Utah
high court, while upholding a modified version of the doctrine, has
questioned the viability of the state's "tender years" statute.' 9'
On the other hand, the picture changes when statutory construc-
tion is taken into account. Of the thirteen "little ERA" states that also
have either parental equalization or gender-neutral statutes, nine have
discarded the tender years doctrine.' 92 As a stipulation to its parent
182. See Rayer v. Rayer, 32 Colo. App. 400, 512 P.2d 637 (1973).
183. Lotton v. Lotton, 169 Mont. 223, 545 P.2d 643 (1976).
184. See Del Pozzo v. Del Pozzo, 113 N.H. 436, 309 A.2d 151 (1973).
185. See Csanyi v. Csanyi, 82 N.M. 411, 483 P.2d 292 (1971).
186. Butcher v. Butcher, 363 P.2d 923 (Wyo. 1961).
187. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
188. Compare Table A with Table F.
189. Commonwealth ex rel Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 299-300, 368 A.2d 635, 638-
40 (1977).
190. See Tables E & F under Illinois and Maryland.
191. See Tables E & F under Utah; note 179 supra. The courts now regard the maternal
preference as important when all other things are equal, but are guided, under the present
statute, by what is in the best interests of the child, not by a promaternal statutory presump-
tion. See Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979); Smith v. Smith, 564 P.2d 307
(Utah 1977); Rice v. Rice, 564 P.2d 305 (Utah 1977).
192. The eight "little ERA" states that follow their parent-equalization or gender-neutral
statutes are Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Texas, and
Washington. Louisiana and Virginia do not follow their parent-equalization statutes be-
cause their courts have expressly upheld the tender years doctrine. The doctrine in New
Hampshire and Wyoming has not been expressly discarded and may still be followed. See
Tables E and F.
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equalization statute, Connecticut requires that awards be made to the
parent "not at fault" in the divorce; however, Connecticut courts, fo-
cusing on "best interest" and rejecting automatic maternal preference,
have tended to ignore this stipulation.'93 Of the four "little ERA"
states that have either "best interest" statutes or statutes giving courts
discretion, two states have interpreted these statutes to mean that both
parents must be treated equally, in accordance with constitutional
guarantees of sexual equality. 194 Thus, given statutes providing for pa-
rental equalization, gender neutrality or the "best interest" of the child,
eleven of the seventeen appellate judiciaries in "little ERA" states-be
they activist or restraintist-have followed or even have gone beyond
legislative attempts to provide gender equality in child custody cases.
2 The Tender Years Doctrine in Non-ERA States
An examination of decisions in the thirty-three non-ERA states
referred to in Table G yields largely similar results. Courts in at least
seven of the twenty-two states with parental equalization and gender-
neutral statutes have adhered to these legislative mandates. 9 Courts
in Georgia, like those in Connecticut, 96 have tended to ignore the leg-
islative requirement for "innocent party" awards. 97 Courts in Iowa
and Maine, where the custody statutes give courts wide discretion, have
rejected the tender years doctrine. 98 Of the eight "best inter-
est"/UMDA states, only Arizona has discarded the doctrine; in the
other states, the doctrine continues to be used as a "tie breaker" or is
subordinate to a determination of the welfare of the child.' 99
193. See Skubas v. Skubas, 31 Conn. Supp. 340, 330 A.2d 105 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979);
Jones, supra note 157, at 704. It is unlikely that a court, concerned with the welfare of the
child, would make an award on the basis that the parent was not responsible for the breakup
of the marriage.
194. State ex rel. Elmore v. Elmore, 46 111. App. 3d 504, 361 N.E.2d 615 (1977); Com-
monwealth ex rel Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977). Montana and possi-
bly New Mexico still adhere to the tender years doctrine.
195. See Table E under California, Delaware, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Nebraska,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, and Oklahoma. Although it is unsettled, Kansas and
Oregon are probably also in this category. Despite their parental-equalization and gender-
neutral statutes, Alabama, Florida, Minnesota, New Jersey, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, and Wisconsin have not discarded the tender years doctrine.
196. See note 193 and accompanying text supra.
197. See Rigdon v. Rigdon, 222 Ga. 679, 151 S.E.2d 712 (1966); Jones, supra note 157, at
706.
198. The other states having statutes that give courts discretion, Mississippi, North Da-
kota, and West Virginia, have not rejected the tender years doctrine.
199. See Table E under Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Missouri, North Dakota, and Rhode
Island. Although it is unsettled, Vermont also appears to still use the doctrine.
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Once again, there appears to be little difference between activist
and conservative courts. The highly activist and gender-activist Cali-
fornia courts follow the state's equalization statute z.2  The gender-ac-
tivist New York courts also adhere to an equalization statute.20' On
the other hand, the activist New Jersey judiciary continues to cling to
the tender years doctrine.2 °2 Meanwhile, the Iowa and Nebraska
courts, following discretionary and gender-neutral statutes, respec-
tively, have issued rulings requiring trial courts to justify awards in de-
tailed and thoughtful terms.20 3 The Iowa Supreme Court in particular
has provided a model of how an appellate court may, without resort to
constitutional arguments, compel trial courts to make gender-neutral
awards. The court stated:
[The "tender years doctrine"] is simply not justified as an apriori
principle. It tends to obscure the basic tenet in custody cases
which overrides all others, the best interests of the children. The
real issue is not the sex of the parent but which parent will do
better in raising the children. Resolution of that issue depends
upon what the evidence actually reveals in each case, not upon
what someone predicts it will show in many cases. If past deci-
sions teach us anything, "it is that each case must be decided on
its own peculiar facts."2"
3. The Tender Years Doctrine and the New Judicial Federalism
The major difference between states that do and do not have "little
ERA's" lies in judicial survival of the tender years doctrine. The doc-
trine continues to be sustained in perhaps a third of the ERA states,
compared with more than half of the non-ERA states.20 5 From this it
might appear that constitutional provisions are somewhat controlling
and that those who have faith in the new judicial federalism are vindi-
cated, at least on this score.
200. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Urband, 68 Cal. App. 3d 796, 137 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1977).
201. State ex re. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1973).
202. Mayer v. Mayer, 150 N.J. Super. 556, 376 A.2d 214 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977).
203. See In re Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 1974), in which the court lists
12 factors that trial courts should take into account when making custody awards. Id. at
687-88. See also In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165 (Iowa 1974) (application of
Bowen principles); Christensen v. Christensen, 191 Neb. 355, 358, 215 N.W.2d 111, 114
(1974) (court lists 10 factors that trial courts should take into account). Bowen is often men-
tioned as a "model" ruling. See, e.g., Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 335-36.
204. In re Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Iowa 1974) (citation omitted).
205. In three ERA states and in four non-ERA states, the status of the doctrine is
uncertain.
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Constitutional mandates, however, are less decisive than might ap-
pear. In only one state, Utah, was it necessary to invalidate a statute on
constitutional grounds. 20 6 In the three other states that struck down the
doctrine on constitutional grounds, alternative means of eliminating
the doctrine were also available. Maryland courts could have used the
state's equalization statute to dispose of the doctrine, and Illinois and
Pennsylvania courts could have abolished the doctrine on other
grounds-as did courts in Iowa and Maine.207
If constitutional provisions are not the decisive factor, an alterna-
tive explanation for differences among states might be found in legisla-
tive action. It is clear that legislatures, in ERA as well as in non-ERA
states, have taken the lead. Statutory directives, however, have not al-
ways been determinative, since, as Table H indicates, some states in
both groups have ignored the statutes. Before the adoption of New
Hampshire's ERA, for example, a statute was enacted that forbade
courts from giving "any preference to either of the parents. . . because
of the parent's sex."2°0 After the adoption of Virginia's ERA, a statute
was enacted that equalized parental rights.209 Yet in neither of these
two states were courts significantly influenced by either the statute or
constitutional command, since the tender years doctrine has not been
discarded. Minnesota's statute provides that judges "shall not prefer
one parent over the other solely on the basis of the sex of the par-
ent."210 Wisconsin law does not permit "one parent [to be preferred]
over the other wholly on the basis of sex." '' Yet Minnesota courts
continue to use the "tender years doctrine" as a tie breaker,21 2 and Wis-
consin courts have had no difficulty in reconciling the doctrine with the
gender-neutral law.213
What emerges, then, is a curious combination of judicial discretion
(in an area in which courts have traditionally exercised great discre-
tion) and statutory and/or constitutional directive. Often, the prime
consideration appears to be the judges' willingness to utilize the legal
framework available to them to eliminate the tender years doctrine.
Courts in Illinois, Maryland, and Pennsylvania thus have employed a
206. Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 517 P.2d 1019, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974).
207. In re Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 1974); Roussel v. State, 274 A.2d
909 (Me. 1971).
208. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (Supp. 1979) (as amended 1975).
209. VA. CODE § 20-107 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
210. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17, subd. 3 (West Supp. 1982) (as amended 1974).
211. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(2) (West 1981).
212. Hoffman v. Hoffman, 303 Minn. 559, 227 N.W.2d 387 (1975).
213. Scolman v. Scolman, 66 Wis. 2d 761, 226 N.W.2d 388 (1975). See also Foster &
Freed, supra note 146, at 363.
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sweeping constitutional approach to eliminate the doctrine as a form of
gender discrimination; 21 4 courts in Arizona and Alaska have elimi-
nated maternal preference merely by adhering closely to statutes that
may not have been concerned with sexual equality,215 and the high
courts in Iowa and Nebraska have banished the doctrine by requiring a
meticulous case-by-case approach to determine the "best interests" of
the child.21 6 The result in terms of gender equality, whatever the aim
or legal foundation, has been much the same.
Conclusion
The advent of the new judicial federalism, as Table B illustrates,
has not produced a vigorous use of state constitutional guarantees to
eliminate gender discrimination. The very paucity of cases may be due
either to the relative newness of the constitutional guarantees or to stat-
utory reforms that either antedated or accompanied the adoption of the
ERA's. The custody cases provide an example of the latter. A more
important factor, however, is litigant preference for federal law and fo-
rums, which has led to federal dominance in the field of gender dis-
crimination. This preference is evidenced by the sheer number of
gender discrimination cases litigated in federal courts. From 1971 to
1979, the United States Supreme Court alone decided nineteen gender
equality cases2 17-more than any state supreme court under a state
ERA.2 18 Federal district courts and federal courts of appeal have de-
cided many times that number. As Table C suggests, federal courts
and law have virtually preempted such crucial matters as employment
discrimination. Even when litigants have raised claims in state courts,
those courts tend to rely on federal law either explicitly, by basing deci-
sions on relevant federal statutes or cases, or indirectly, by using the
Supreme Court's equal protection methodology when interpreting the
state constitution.
The survey of state and federal gender equality cases offers little
support, therefore, for those who proclaim or hope that state courts will
respond to the promise of the new judicial federalism. Although some
214. State ex rel Elmore v. Elmore, 46 IMl. App. 3d 504, 361 N.E.2d 615 (1977); McAn-
drew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel Spriggs v.
Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977).
215. King v. King. 477 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1970); Georgia v. Georgia, 27 Ariz. App. 271,
553 P.2d 1256 (1976).
216. See note 203 supra.
217. See L. GOLDSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN: CASES IN LAW AND
SOCIAL CHANGE 381-87 (1979).
218. See ERA IMPACT PROJECT CLEARINGHOUSE, INDEX AND REFERENCE (1980).
[Vol. 9:919
GENDER EQUALITY AND STATE COURTS
state courts have indeed employed state constitutions to afford greater
support for gender equality than have federal courts, the fact remains
that explicit constitutional bans against sex discrimination do not in
themselves guarantee greater protection. In other words, the "little
ERA's" do not, at least thus far, compensate for the lack of a federal
ERA.
On the other hand, as the consortium and custody cases demon-
strate, this does not mean that state appellate courts have been inactive.
At times taking clues from federal courts, at times responding to legis-
lative mandates, and at times proceeding on their own initiative, state
courts have decided a variety of cases with wide implications for gen-
der equality. The net, and certainly little noted, result of these deci-
sions has been that traditional views about the functions, roles, and
responsibilities of women and men have been largely eliminated in
these areas.
These observations strongly suggest that civil liberties advocates in
general, and womens' rights advocates in particular, explore alternative
means of achieving their desired goals. A recent study of selected state
supreme court rulings over the past 100 years reveals that courts,
through the exercise of their common law jurisdiction and by means of
statutory interpretation, have indicated increasing concern "with the
individual, the down-trodden" and with deliberate social change.219
Judicially initiated reform in tort law, for example, much of which has
taken place in the past twenty years, is indicative of one way in which
courts "venture" to "do justice" and points toward the possibility that
tort law may develop along lines that will oblige governments and citi-
zens to behave carefully and responsibly.22° The New Jersey Supreme
Court, for one, has historically based what are essentially civil rights
and liberties rulings on common law.221 It also recently interpreted an
unremarkable constitutional directive to provide a "thorough and effi-
219. Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, supra note 8, at 155.
220. See R. KEETON, supra note 7; M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1977). "The analysis [offered] here thrusts toward an alternative defi-
nition of duty, specifically stated with reference to cases that generally are known as failures
to act. From these cases and across these pages come many persons whose plights touch us
at a level so deep that we must either help them or turn away, aware of our own vulnerabil-
ity." id at xii.
221. Project Report: Toward an Activist Rolefor State Bills of Rights, supra note 18, at
338-39. In State v. Shack, 58 N.J. 297, 277 A.2d 369 (1971), the court drew upon the com-
mon law to protect the right of migrant laborers to confer, against the wishes of property
owners, with Office of Economic Opportunity personnel in the privacy of their homes. See
also Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47
(1972), which recognizes the right of open access to beaches.
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cient education 22 2 to mean that per pupil expenditures must be sub-
stantially equalized throughout the state-thus reading an equal
protection guarantee into the mandate to establish public schools.
2 2
Although state appellate courts hear a far greater variety of cases
than do their federal counterparts, unlike judicial policymaking at the
national level, state court policymaking is taken largely for granted.224
For litigants who are anxious to use the courts as vehicles for change,
the judiciaries of the fifty states and the store of common law, statutes,
and constitutional provisions upon which they may draw, present a
vast and largely untapped reservoir. As our findings suggest, it is in the
day-by-day business of the state courts, rather than through extraordi-
nary constitutional litigation, that the full potential of the new judicial
federalism may be realized.
222. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, cl. 1.
223. Robinson v. Cahill, 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
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Year State Overall Gender
State ERA Ratified Activism Activism
Rhode Island No No
South Carolina No No
South Dakota No No
Tennessee No No
Texas 1972 No Yes
Utah 1896 No No
Vermont No No
Virginia 1971 No No
Washington 1972 Yes Yes
West Virginia No No
Wisconsin Moderate No
Wyoming 1896 No No
al Civil Liberties Activism refers to a court that has, generally, a reputation for sympa-
thetic consideration of civil liberties claims and has relied on state constitutions to ex-
tend protections for individual rights that are broader than those accorded by the
Burger Court. For examples of this activism, see note 50 supra. For commentary on
state high court civil libertarian activism in the post-Warren court years, see note 18
supra. See also Neuborne, Toward Procedural Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22
WM. & MARY L. REv. 725, 725 n.2 (1981).
a2 The designations of whether or not a court is gender activist are based on Driscoll &
Rouse, Through a Glass Darkly: A Look at State ERA's, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1282
(1978), and ERA IMPACT PROJECT CLEARINGHOUSE, INDEX AND REFERENCE (1980).
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Table B
Litigation Under State Equal Rights Amendments
Invalidation of
Total State Supreme Sex-Based Rulings
Court Cases Under or Classifications
State ERA Under ERA










New Hampshire 1b14 1b
l 5








Sources: LEGAL REFERENCE GUIDE TO STATE ERA's (1982).
bI Plas v. State, 598 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1979) (criminal); Brown v. Wood, 575 P.2d 760
(Alaska 1978) (employment); Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska 1974) (family).
b2 Plas v. State, 598 P.2d 966 (Alaska 1979); Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alaska
1974).
b3 R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666 (1980) (family); Menne v. Menne, 194 Colo. 304, 572
P.2d 472 (1977) (family); People v. Salinas, 191 Colo. 171, 551 P.2d 703 (1976) (crimi-
nal); People v. Barger, 191 Colo. 152, 550 P.2d 1281 (1976) (criminal); Sylvara v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 191 Colo. 92, 550 P.2d 868 (1976) (employment); In re Marriage of
Franks, 189 Colo. 499, 542 P.2d 845 (1975) (family); People v. Taylor, 189 Colo. 202,
540 P.2d 320 (1975) (procedure); People v. Gould, 188 Colo. 113, 532 P.2d 953 (1975)
(criminal); People v. Elliott, 186 Colo. 65, 525 P.2d 457 (1974) (family); People v.
Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973) (criminal).
b4 R. McG. v. J.W., 615 P.2d 666 (1980).
b5 Page v. Welfare Comm'r, 170 Con. 258, 365 A.2d 1118 (1976) (procedure).
b6 State v. Rivera, 62 Hawaii 120, 612 P.2d 526 (1980) (criminal); Holdman v. Olim, 59
Hawaii 346, 581 P.2d 1164 (1978) (criminal).
b7 People v. Yocum, 66 Ill. 2d 211, 361 N.E.2d 1369 (1977) (family); People v. Boyer, 63
Ill. 2d 433, 349 N.E.2d 50 (1976) (family); People v. Grammer, 62 III. 2d 393, 342
N.E.2d 371 (1976) (procedure); In re Estate of Karas, 61 IMI. 2d 40, 329 N.E.2d 234
(1975) (procedure); Phelps v. Bing, 58 Il. 2d 32, 316 N.E.2d 775 (1974) (family); Peo-
ple v. Ellis, 57 Il. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974) (criminal).
b8 Phelps v. Bing, 58 IlM. 2d 32, 316 N.E.2d 775 (1974); People v. Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d 127, 311
N.E.2d 98 (1974).
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b9 Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981) (family);
Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980) (torts); Kerr v. Kerr, 287 Md. 363,
412 A.2d 1001 (1980) (family); Kemp v. Kemp, 287 Md. 165, 411 A.2d 1028 (1980)
(family); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977) (family); Maryland State
Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973) (procedure).
blO Condore v. Prince George's County, 289 Md. 516, 425 A.2d 1011 (1981); Kline v.
Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980); Kemp v. Kemp, 287 Md. 165, 411 A.2d 1028
(1980); Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 374 A.2d 900 (1977).
bl 1 Lowell v. Kowalski, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1243, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980) (family); Attor-
rhey General v. MIAA, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979) (education);
Commonwealth v. King, 374 Mass. 5, 372 N.E.2d 196 (1977) (criminal); Secretary of
the Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977) (family);
Ebitz v. Pioneer Nat'l Bank, 372 Mass. 207, 361 N.E.2d 225 (1977) (education).
b12 Lowell v. Kowalski, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1243, 405 N.E.2d 135 (1980); Attorney Gen-
eral v. MIAA, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979); Secretary of the
Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977).
b13 In re Cram, 606 P.2d 145 (1980) (procedure); State v. Henry, 177 Mont. 426, 582 P.2d
321 (1978) (criminal); Rogers v. Rogers, 169 Mont. 403, 548 P.2d 141 (1976) (proce-
dure); State v. Craig, 169 Mont. 150, 545 P.2d 649 (1976) (criminal); In re Kujath, 169
Mont. 128, 545 P.2d 662 (1976) (family); Taylor v. Taylor, 167 Mont. 164, 537 P.2d 483
(1975) (family); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 166 Mont. 312, 533 P.2d 1079 (1975) (procedure);
Clontz v. Clontz, 166 Mont. 206, 531 P.2d 1003 (1975) (procedure).
b14 Buckner v. Buckner, 120 N.H. 402, 415 A.2d 871 (1980) (family).
b15 Id.
b16 Futrell v. Ahrens, 88 N.M. 284, 540 P.2d 214 (1975) (education). Schaab v. Schaab, 87
N.M. 220, 531 P.2d 954 (1974) (family).
b17 Murphy v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 282 Pa. Super. 244, 422 A.2d 1097 (1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 896 (1981) (insurance); Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v.
Mars Community Boys Baseball Ass'n, 488 Pa. 102, 410 A.2d 1246 (1980) (procedure);
George v. George, 487 Pa. 133, 409 A.2d 1 (1979) (family); In re Estate of Klein, 474
Pa. 416, 378 A.2d 1182 (1977) (family); Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470
Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977) (family); Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165, 360 A.2d 603
(1976) (family); Staufer v. Staufer, 465 Pa. 558, 351 A.2d 236 (1976) (family); Butler v.
Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 347 A.2d 477 (1975) (family); Commonwealth v. Saunders, 459 Pa.
677, 331 A.2d 193 (1975) (criminal); DiFlorida v. DiFlorida, 459 Pa. 641,331 A.2d 174
(1975) (family); Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974) (criminal);
Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974) (family); Hopkins v. Blanco,
457 Pa. 90, 320 A.2d 109 (1974) (family); Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324
(1974) (family).
b18 In re Estate of Klein, 474 Pa. 416, 378 A.2d 1182 (1977); Commonwealth ex rel.
Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290,368 A.2d 635 (1977); Adoption of Walker, 468 Pa. 165,
360 A.2d 603 (1976); Butler v. Butler, 464 Pa. 522, 347 A.2d 477 (1975); Common-
wealth v. Saunders, 459 Pa. 677, 331 A.2d 193 (1975); DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa.
641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975); Commonwealth v. Butler, 458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974);
Henderson v. Henderson, 458 Pa. 97, 327 A.2d 60 (1974); Hopkins v. Blanco, 457 Pa.
90, 320 A.2d 109 (1974); Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 318 A.2d 324 (1974).
b19 In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1980) (family); Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d
665 (Tex. 1978) (family); Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. 1973) (torts).
b20 Whittlesey v. Miller, 572 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1978); Felsenthal v. McMillan, 493 S.W.2d
729 (Tex. 1973).
b21 Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975) (family); Turner v. Department of Employment
See., 531 P.2d 870 (Utah 1975) (employment); Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517
P.2d 1010 (1974) (family); Kopp v. Salt Lake City, 29 Utah 2d 170, 506 P.2d 809
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(1973) (employment); In re Estate of Armstrong, 21 Utah 2d 89, 440 P.2d 881 (1968)
(wills); Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 46 Utah 60, 148 P. 1104 (1915) (taxes).
b22 Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975).
b23 Archer v. Mayes, 213 Va. 633, 194 S.E.2d 707 (1973) (juries).
b24 MacLean v. First N.W. Indus. of America, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981)
(procedure); Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980) (fam-
ily); Willard v. State Dep't of Social & Health Servs., 91 Wash. 2d 759, 592 P.2d 1103
(1979) (family); Wyman v. Wallace, 91 Wash. 2d 317, 588 P.2d 1133 (1979) (torts);
Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 584 P.2d 918 (1978) (criminal); Marchioro v.
Chaney, 90 Wash. 2d 298, 582 P.2d 487 (1978) (political parties); Bolser v. Washington
State Liquor Control Bd., 90 Wash. 2d 223, 580 P.2d 629 (1978) (employment); State v.
Wood, 89 Wash. 2d 97, 569 P.2d 1148 (1977) (family); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d
859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975) (education).
b25 MacLean v. First N.W. Indus. of America, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 635 P.2d 683 (1981);
Lundgren v. Whitney's, Inc., 94 Wash. 2d 91, 614 P.2d 1272 (1980); Darrin v. Gould,
85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
b26 State v. Yazzie, 67 Wyo. 256, 218 P.2d 482 (1950) (juries); McKinney v. State, 3 Wyo.
719, 30 P. 293 (1892) (procedure).
b27 State v. Yazzie, 67 Wyo. 256, 218 P.2d 482 (1950).
958 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 9:919
Table C
Issues Raised Under State ERA'sci













cl The information in this table was compiled from Table B.
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Dini v. Naiditch, 20
Ill. 2d 406, 170
N.E.2d 881 (1960)
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224 Pa. Super. 116,
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Page v. Winter, 240
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Rush v. Great Am.
Ins. Co., 213 Tenn.
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Garrett v. Reno Oil
Co., 271 S.W.2d 764
(Tex. Civ. App. 1954)
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985 (1972)
Baldwin v. State, 125
Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492
(1965)
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F.2d 772 (4th Cir.
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1971)
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Table E
The "Tender Years" Doctrine in State Statutes and
Appellate Case Law
- Courts given discretion
- Tender Years doctrine
- Gender-neutral statutes, prohibit consideration of sex of parent, "de-sexed" custody statute
- Best interests of child
- Equal rights for both parents
- Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act followed in whole or in part
- precise and detailed statute based on UMDA
Statute
Activist Gender-Acti-
Court vist Court Case Law
Constitutional
Rulings
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Activist Gender-Acti- Constitutional
State Statute Court vist Court Case Law Rulings
Kentucky BIC, ERP, No No TYD subordinate to
UMDA +136 BIC,7
Louisiana ERP, award to party No No TYD subordinate to TYD sustained against
(ERA 1974) "not at fault" BIC
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No No TYD subordinate to
BIC 
2
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BIC; TYD not incon-




still persist as rebutta-
ble presumption" 10
Sources: B. BROWN, A. FREEDMAN, H. KATZ, & A. PRINCE, WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND THE
LAW (1977); ERA IMPACT PROJECT CLEARINGHOUSE, INDEX AND REFERENCES (1980); Fos-
ter & Freed, Lfe with Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, esp. Appendix, 343-63 (1978); Freed
& Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of 1978, 14 FAM. L.Q. 229 (1981);
Jones, The Tender Years Doctrine: Survey and Analysis, 16 J. FAM. L. 695 (1978); Miller,
Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345 (1979); Ortner & Lewis, Evidence o/Single-Father Compe-
tence in Childrearing, 12 FAM. L.Q. 27 (1979); PodeU, Peck, & First, Custody---to Which
Parent?, 13 FAM. L. NEWSLETTER 506, 512-17 (1973); Roth, The Tejzder Years Presumption
in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. LAW 423 (1977); Weitzman & Dixon, Child Custody
Awards: Legal Standards and Empirical Patterns for Child Custody, Support and Visitation
After Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 473 (1979); Developments in the Law-The Constitution and
the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1333-38 (1980). Custody statutes were revised during
the 1970's. Beginning in 1976, states began to adopt UMDA guidelines in significant
numbers.
el ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1975). The statute formally provides for equal rights for both
parents. Jones, supra note 157, at 702, claims that "without so stating,' it implies a
maternal preference for children under seven years.
e2 Skipper v. Skipper, 280 Ala. 506, 195 So. 2d 797 (1967); Linderman v. Linderman, 49
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e3 Thom pson v. Thompson, 47 Ala. App. 57, 326 So. 2d 124 (1975), cert. denied, 295
Ala. 425, 326 So. 2d 129 (1976).
e4 ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.205 (Supp. 1980).
e5 King v. King, 477 P.2d 356 (Alaska 1970).
e6 Jones, supra note 157, at 703, lists the doctrine as a "tiebreaker" in Alaska. Foster &
Freed, supra note 146, at 343, indicate that it is no longer employed. See Curgus v.
Curgus, 514 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1973). Sheridan v. Sheridan, 466 P.2d 821 (Alaska
1970).
e7 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (Supp. 1981).
e8 Morales v. Glenn, 114 Ariz. 327, 560 P.2d 1234 (1977); Georgia v. Georgia, 27 Ariz.
App. 271, 553 P.2d 1256 (1976); Porter v. Porter, 21 Ariz. App. 300, 518 P.2d 1017
(1974); Orezza v. Ramirez, 19 Ariz. App. 405, 507 P.2d 1017 (1973).
e9 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2726 (Supp. 1981). Statute changed from UMDA to D (courts
given discretion).
el0 Case law supports maternal preference according to age and sex of child. Weber v.
Weber, 256 Ark. 549, 508 S.W.2d 725 (1974); Moore v. Smith, 255 Ark. 249, 499
S.W.2d 634 (1973); Qualls v. Qualls, 250 Ark. 328, 465 S.W.2d 110 (1971).
el 1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West Supp. 1978); maternal preference abolished, Act of
Aug. 17, 1972, ch. 1007, § 1, 1972 Cal. Stat. 1854-55.
e12 In re Marriage of Urband, 68 Cal. App. 3d 796, 137 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1977); Russo v.
Russo, 21 Cal. App. 3d 72, 98 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1971).
e13 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1973 & Supp. 1980).
e14 Rayer v. Rayer, 32 Colo. App. 400, 512 P.2d 637 (1973).
el5 Menne v. Menne, 194 Colo. 304, 572 P.2d 472 (1977).
e16 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 466-56 (West Supp. 1980).
e17 Raymond v. Raymond, 165 Conn. 735, 345 A.2d 48 (1974); Skubas v. Skubas, 31
Conn. Supp. 340, 330 A.2d 105 (Conn. Super Ct. 1974).
e18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722(b) (1981).
e19 Nelson v. Murray, 58 Del. 516, 211 A.2d 842 (1965).
e20 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2) (West Supp. 1981).
e21 Bone v. Bone, 334 So. 2d 142 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Klavans v. Klavans, 330 So.
2d 811 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Snedaker v. Snedaker, 327 So. 2d 72 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); Ross v. Ross, 321 So. 2d 443 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (sustained TYD
despite equalizing statute).
e22 GA. CODE ANN. § 74-107 (Supp. 1978).
e23 Allsop v. Allsop, 236 Ga. 728, 225 S.E.2d 284 (1976); Todd v. Todd, 234 Ga. 156, 215
S.E.2d 4 (1975); Folsom v. Folsom, 228 Ga. 536, 186 S.E.2d 752 (1972). Georgia
courts will not follow "innocent party" stipulation. Rigdon v. Rigdon, 226 Ga. 679,
151 S.E.2d 712 (1966).
e24 HAwAIi REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
e25 Turoffv. Turoff, 56 Hawaii 51, 527 P.2d 1275 (1974).
e26 IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (Supp. 1981).
e27 This statute apparently has not been updated. Commentary on the case law is con-
fusing. Jones, supra note 157, maintains that courts "refuse to consider" the TYD.
Id. at 706 (citing Olson v. Olson, 47 Idaho 374, 276 P. 34 (1929)). On the other hand,
Foster & Freed, supra note 146, maintain that TYD is only employed "where all
other things are equal," ie., as a "tie breaker." Id. at 349 (citing Barrett v. Barrett, 94
Idaho 64, 480 P.2d 910 (1971)). In one case cited by Jones, supra note 157, the Idaho
Supreme Court reversed a maternal award made because the mother, as mother,
could best fulfill the maternal obligation. In Annest v. Annest, 96 Idaho 566, 532
P.2d 571 (1975), however, the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the pri-
mar consideration was not the ability of the parents to fulfill their obligations, -but
thebest interest of the child.
e28 Illinois Marriage and Divorce Act, § 602, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 640 (Smith-Hurd
1980).
e29 See, e.g., Elmore v. Elmore, 46 Ill. App. 3d 504, 361 N.E.2d 615 (1977). Maternal
preference was abandoned because of "recent social and legal trends" as well. Brady
v. Brady, 26 Ill. App. 3d 131, 324 N.E.2d 645, 650 (1975). Two years later, the same
court held that "unusual circumstances" could justify the use of the tender years doc-
trine. Rayburn v. Rayburn, 45 Ill. App. 3d 712, 360 N.E.2d 142 (1977). On the
whole, however, Illnois courts no longer employ the doctrine. Foster & Freed, supra
note 146, at 350, maintain that the doctrine was abandoned after the adoption of the
state ERA.
e30 IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21 (West 1979).
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e31 Schwartz v. Schwartz, 170 Ind. App. 241, 351 N.E.2d 900 (1976); Franks v. Franks,
163 Ind. App. 346, 323 N.E.2d 678 (1975); Leohr v. Leohr, 161 Ind. App. 514, 316
N.E.2d 400 (1974).
e32 IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West Supp. 1977-78); IOWA R. CIv. PROC. 344(015.
e33 Hobson v. Hobson, 248 N.W.2d 137 (Iowa 1976); In re Ferguson, 244 N.W.2d 817
(Iowa 1976); In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165 (Iowa 1975); Blessing v.
Blessing, 220 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1974); In re Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683
(Iowa 1974) (TYD explicitly abandoned).
e34 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(b) (Supp. 1980).
e35 According to both Jones, supra note 157, at 708-09, and Foster & Freed, supra note
146, at 351, the case law since the adoption of the 1977 amendment is unclear, and
cases are in conflict. Prior to 1977, courts tended to use the TYD as a tie breaker.
See Parrish v. Parrish, 220 Kan. 131, 551 P.2d 792 (1976); Patton v. Patton, 215 Kan.
377, 524 P.2d 709 (1974); Berry v. Berry, 215 Kan. 47, 523 P.2d 342 (1974); Dalton V.
Dalton, 214 Kan. 805, 522 P.2d 378 (1974); St. Clair v. St. Clair, 211 Kan. 468, 507
P.2d 206 (1973); Moudy v. Moudy, 211 Kan. 213, 505 P.2d 764 (1973).
e36 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.070 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980).
e37 Although there is little case law that interprets the newly revised statute, courts have
emphasized best interest as the "overriding issue." Evitson v. Evitson, 507 S.W.2d
153 (Ky. 1974). In Jones v. Jones, 577 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1979), maternal preference was
rejected. See also Brown v. Brown, 510 S.W.2d 14 (Ky. 1974); Parker v. Parker, 467
S.W.2d 595 (Ky. 1971).
e38 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 157(A) (West Supp. 1981).
e39 Crowe v. Crowe, 344 So. 2d 408 (La. Ct. App. 1977).
e40 Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236 (La. Ct. App. 1975).
e41 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (Supp. 1981).
e42 The Maine Supreme Court has held that the best interest of the child must be para-
mount. Buzzell v. Buzzell, 235 A.2d 828 (Me. 1967). TYD was abandoned in Rousel
v. State, 274 A.2d 909 (Me. 1971).
e43 MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1978).
e44 There was case law sustaining TYD as a "tie breaker" until 1978. See Cooke v.
Cooke, 21 Md. App. 376, 319 A.2d 841 (1974); Kirstukas v. Kirstukas, 14 Md. App.
190, 286 A.2d 535 (1972).
e45 McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. 1, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978).
e46 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1980).
e47 Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 353, maintain that there are no recent cases to
indicate adherence or nonadherence to the statute, but that TYD is no longer in ef-
fect. Jones, supra note 157, at 711, maintains that the courts are guided by best inter-
est (citing Masters v. Craddock, 4 Mass. App. Ct. 426, 351 N.E.2d 217 (1976)).
e48 MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 722.25, 722.23 (Supp. 1980).
e49 Burghdoff v. Burghdoff, 66 Mich. App. 608, 239 N.W.2d 679 (1976); Zawisa v.
Zawisa, 61 Mich. App. 1, 232 N.W.2d 275 (1975); Feldman v. Feldman, 55 Mich.
A 1i47, 222 N.W.2d 2 (1974); Pyle v. Pyle, 32 Mich. App. 361, 188 N.W.2d 641
e5O MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518(17) (West Supp. 1981).
e51 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 303 Minn. 559, 227 N.W.2d 387 (1975); Erickson v. Erickson,
300 Minn. 559, 220 N.W.2d 487 (1974); Ryg v. Kerkow, 296 Minn. 265, 207 N.W.2d
701 (1973).
e52 Davis v. Davis, 306 Minn. 536, 235 N.W.2d 836 (1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 943
(1976).
e53 Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1981).
e54 Case law leans toward BIC, but courts employ TYD unless the mother is unfit. Yates
v. Yates, 284 So. 2d 46 (Miss. 1973); Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 245 So. 2d 845 (Miss. 1971).
e55 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (Vernon 1977).
e56 Shannon v. Shannon, 550 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Downing v. Downing,
537 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); In re W.K.M., 537 S.W.2d 183 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976); Rudloff v. Rudloff, 533 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); In re Marriage of
Zigler, 529 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Johnson v. Johnson, 526 S.W.2d 33 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975); L.D.H. v. T.P.H., 492 S.W.2d 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
e57 MONT. CODE ANN. § 332 (Supp. 1977).'
e58 TYD is recognized as a long-standing policy, but is not controlling. See Lotton v.
Lotton, 169 Mont. 223, 545 P.2d 643 (1976); Love v. Love, 166 Mont. 303, 533 P.2d
280 (1974).
e59 NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364 (1978).
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e60 Boroffv. Boroff, 197 Neb. 641, 250 N.W.2d 613 (1977); Knight v. Knight, 196 Neb.
63, 241 N.W.2d 360 (1976).
e61 NEV. REv. STAT. § 125.140 (1981).
e62 Nicols v. Nicols, 91 Nev. 479, 537 P.2d 1196 (1975); Culbertson v. Culbertson, 91
Nev. 230, 523 P.2d 768 (1975). Maternal preference was not recognized in Arnold v.
Arnold, 95 Nev. 951, 604 P.2d 109 (1979).
e63 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (Supp. 1979).
e64 Del Pozzo v. Del Pozzo, 113 N.H. 436, 309 A.2d 151 (1973); Lemay v. Lemay, 109
N.H. 217, 247 A.2d 189 (1968).
e65 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 1976).
e66 Mayer v. Mayer, 150 N.J. Super. 556, 376 A.2d 214 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977);
Vannucchi v. Vannucchi, 113 N.J. Super. 40, 272 A.2d 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1971).
e67 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (1978).
e68 Jones, supra note 157, at 715, reports that case law is unsettled since adoption of the
new law. Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 357, note that TYD had been employed
as a factor in making custody determinations. Csanyi v. Csanyi, 82 N.M. 411, 483
P.2d 292 (1971).
e69 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 70, 240 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1981-82).
e70 Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973), held that
TYD violates both the statute and the federal Constitution.
e71 Id.
e72 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (Supp. 1981).
e73 Courts have employed BIC. Hinkle v. Hinkle, 266 N.C. 189, 146 S.E.2d 73 (1966).
e74 N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22 (1981).
e75 Jones, supra note 157, at 716, maintains that courts follow BIC (citing De Forest v.
De Forest, 228 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1975)). Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 358,
maintain that TYD probably is used as a "tie breaker" (citing Ferguson v. Ferguson,
202 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1972)). See also Kottsick v. Carlson, 241 N.W.2d 842 (N.D.
1976); Matson v. Matson, 226 N.W.2d 659 (N.D. 1975); Silseth v. Levang, 214
N.W.2d 361 (N.D. 1974).
e76 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.03, 3109.04 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1981).
e77 Jones, supra note 157, at 716, maintains that TYD still employed (citing Beaber v.
Beaber, 41 Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974)), but Foster'& Freed, supra note
146, at 339, maintain that it is not (citing McVay v. McVay, 44 Ohio App. 2d 370, 338
N.E.2d 772 (1974)).
e78 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 11 (West 1976).
e79 Duncan v. Duncan, 449 P.2d 267 (Okla. 1969); Irwin v. Irwin, 416 P.2d 853 (Okla.
1966).
e80 Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d 1271 (Okla), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 863 (1978).
e81 OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137 (1979-80).
e82 Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 359, maintain that the law is unsettled. Ray v.
Ray, I 1 Or. App. 246, 502 P.2d 397 (1972); Deardoffv. Deardoff, 2 Or. App. 117, 467
P.2d 137 (1970). Jones, supra note 157, at 717, maintains that the courts are guided
by the "best interest" standard and that TYD is no Ion ger applied (citing In re Gaub,
25 Or. App. 107, 548 P.2d 179 (1976); Ray v. Ray, 11 Or. App. 246, 502 P.2d 397
(1972)).
e83 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 92 (Purdon 1972).
e84 E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977).
e85 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (Supp. 1981).
e86 Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 360, maintain that TYD still persists (citin
Loebenber v. Loebenberg, 85 R.I. 115, 127 A.2d 500 (1956)). Jones, supra note 157,
at 718, maintains that BIC is the controlling factor despite recognition of TYD as a
factor (citing Zinni v. Zinni, 103 R.I. 417, 238 A.2d373 (1968); Loebenberg v.
Loebenberg, 84 R.I. 115, 127 A.2d 500 (1956)).
e87 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-160, 21-21-10 (Law. Coop. 1976).
e88 Jones v. Ard, 265 S.C. 423, 219 S.E.2d 358 (1975).
e89 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-5-7 (1976).
e90 Hershey v. Hershey, 85 S.D. 85, 177 N.W.2d 267 (1970); Yager v. Yager, 83 S.D. 315,
159 N.W.2d 125 (1968).
e91 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-828 (Supp. 1981).
e92 Mollish v. Mollish, 494 S.W.2d 145 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972).
e93 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (Vernon 1975).
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e94 Tye v. Tye, 532 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Erwin v. Erwin, 505 S.W.2d 370
(Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
e95 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (Supp. 1981). Courts are directed to make "equitable"
custody orders. Id. at § 30-3-5(l) (Supp. 1981).
e96 The courts regard the maternal preference as important when all other things are
equal, but cases indicate that courts are guided by BIC, not by a promaternal statu-
tory presumption. See Jorgenson v. Jorgenson, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah 1979); Smith v.
Smith, 564 P.2d 307 (Utah 1977); Rice v. Rice, 564 P.2d 305 (Utah 1977).
e97 Arends v. Arends, 30 Utah 2d 328, 517 P.2d 1019 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881
(1974). In Cox v. Cox, 532 P.2d 994 (Utah 1975), however, the court ruled that under
the state constitution mothers have no absolute right to custody.
e98 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 292, 557 (1974).
e99 Savery v. Savery, 134 Vt. 391, 360 A.2d 58 (1976).
el00 VA. CODE § 20-107 (Supp. 1981).
el0l McCreery v. McCreery, 218 Va. 352, 237 S.E.2d 167 (1977).
e102 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.16.125, 26.09.190 (Supp. 1978).
e103 Foster & Freed, supra note 146, at 362, maintain that TYD is probably no longer in
effect (citing Brauhn v. Brauhn, 10 Wash. App. 592, 518 P.2d 1089 (1974)). Jones,
supra note 157, at 722, maintains that earlier cases indicate adherence to TYD (citing
Barstad v. Barstad, 74 Wash. 2d 295, 444 P.2d 691 (1968)).
e104 W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1980).
el05 Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 216 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1975).
e106 J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978).
e107 Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 767.24(2), 766.15 (West 1981).
e108 Johnson v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 2d 137, 254 N.W.2d 198 (1977); Scolman v. Scolman, 66
Wis. 2d 761, 226 N.W.2d 388 (1975).
e109 Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-113 (1977).
el 10 Wilson v. Wilson, 473 P.2d 595 (Wyo. 1970); Butcher v. Butcher, 363 P.2d 923 (Wyo.
1961).
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Utah Yes BIC, TYD discar
Washington* Probably not BIC
Wyoming Possibly GN, TYD discar



















* = activist, gender-activist, or intermittently activist courts
ERP = statute provides for equal rights for both parents
GN = statute prohibits preference based on sex of parent
BIC = "best interest of the child," may include UMDA guide-
lines
TYD = tender years doctrine
D = courts given discretion
Doctrine Constitutional
ate Employed Statute Ruling
No ERP No
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Table G
Status of "Tender Years" Doctrine in Non-ERA Statesgi
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gl The information in this table was compiled from Table E.
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Table H
ERA and Non-ERA States That Retain "Tender Years Doctrine"
Despite Statutes That Provide Equal Rights for Both Parents
Or Prohibit Preference Based on Sex of Either ParenthI
KEY: * = activist or gender-activist courts
(?) = states in which doctrine possibly persists or law is unsettled
ERA States Non-ERA States
Louisiana Alabama
New Hampshire (?) Florida*













hl The information in this table was compiled from Table E.

